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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a2(3), because this is an appeal from a judgment of a court of record over which the
Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that the payments by Southern American
Insurance Company ("SAIC") to CSX Corporation ("CSX") in exchange for a
release of CSX's current and future claims were for new and contemporaneous
consideration and therefore not voidable preferences under Utah Code Ann.
§31A-27-321?

2.

Should the trial court's grant of summary judgment for CSX be affirmed because
the payments are not voidable preferences under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321
because they (a) were made in the ordinary course of SAIC's business within 45
days of incurring the debts and according to normal business terms; and (b)
were not for an antecedent debt.
Both issues were raised before the trial court through cross-motions for summary

judgment. (R. 615-28.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c); see Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, j[6, 983 P.2d 575. This
Court reviews for correctness whether the trial court properly entered summary

1

judgment for CSX. See Nova Cas. Co., 1999 UT 69, at 1J6, 983 P.2d 575. Further,
(

"[i]n matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's

ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions.'" Valley Colour,
Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-102 (Supp. 2001). Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(h) "Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation:
(i) when in exchange for the property or an obligation, as a fair equivalent
for it, and in good faith:
(A)
property is conveyed;
(B)
services are rendered;
(C)
an obligation is incurred; or
(D)
an antecedent debt is satisfied;
(ii) when the property or obligation is received in good faith to secure a
present advance or an antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately
small compared to the value of the property or obligation obtained.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 (1999). Voidable preferences and liens.
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any of the property of
an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent
debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one year before the filing of a
successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation under this chapter, the effect of
which transfer may enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than another creditor of the same class would receive. If a liquidation order is
entered while the insurer is already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers
otherwise qualifying are considered to be preferences if they are made or
allowed within one year before the filing of the successful petition for
rehabilitation or within two years before the filing of the successful petition for
liquidation, whichever time is shorter,
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, if:
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer;
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing of the petition;
(iii) the creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it or his agent acting with
reference to the transfer had, at the time when the transfer was made,
2

reasonable cause to believe that the insurer was or was about to become
insolvent; or
(iv) the creditor receiving it was an officer, an employee, an attorney, or other
person who was in fact in a position of comparable influence in the insurer
to an officer, or any shareholder holding directly or indirectly more than
5% of any class of equity security issued by the insurer, or any other
person with whom the insurer did not deal at arm's length.
(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for or because
of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a debt incurred in the
ordinary course of the business of the insurer and according to normal business
terms;
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable the insurer to acquire the
property and which is perfected within ten days after the security interest
attaches;
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent that after the transfer,
the creditor gave new value not secured by an unavoidable security interest and
on account of which the insurer did not make an unavoidable transfer to or for
the benefit of the creditor; or
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all of those types of
transfers to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount by which the debt
secured by the security interest exceeded the value of the security interest four
months prior to the date of liquidation or any time subsequent to the liquidation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case arises from the liquidation of Southern American Insurance Company
("SAIC"). The liquidator of SAIC ("Liquidator") brought this action in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, seeking to avoid and recover payments that CSX
received from SAIC pursuant to a lawful settlement of claims relating to asbestos
insurance coverage with SAIC. The Liquidator claimed that the settlement payments

3

constituted preferential transfers under Utah law and were subject to avoidance and
recovery.
CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the payments were
not avoidable preferences as a matter of law because they were made in exchange for
new and contemporaneous consideration. The Liquidator opposed CSX's motion and
submitted his own motion for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the
trial court ruled that the payments were not voidable preferences because they were for
new and contemporaneous consideration as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of CSX and denied the Liquidator's motion. The
Liquidator appeals from the final judgment entered by the trial court.
Statement of Facts
SAIC is a Utah company in the business of providing insurance coverage and
paying benefits to cover claims of policy holders. (R. 2, 38, 311.) SAIC was originally
incorporated and began providing insurance coverage in 1934 in Tennessee. (R. 210.)
In 1988, SAIC became domiciled in Utah. (R. 210.)
As part of its insurance business, SAIC sold third-party liability insurance policies
to certain railroads that were predecessors of CSX.1 (R. 237-38, 264-65.) These
policies covered part of CSX's liability for asbestos exposure, including expenses
incurred defending claims. (R. 251-52.)

Under these policies, SAIC was obligated to

indemnify CSX for "SUMS WHICH [CSX] SHALL BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO

1

The railroads actually were predecessors of, and SAIC actually made the
payments at issue to, CSX Transportation, Inc., a subsidiary of CSX. (R. 234, 264.)
However, for convenience in this brief, "CSX" refers to both defendant CSX Corporation
and CSX Transportation, Inc., except as indicated.
4

PAY AS DAMAGES" (R. 333) and for "EXPENSES PAID OR INCURRED." (R. 334.)
The policies provided that SAIC had no liability for payment to CSX until CSX had
actually made its own payments on covered liabilities or expenses2 and declared CSX
would have no cause of action for indemnity until its liability was "FINALLY
DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL
TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF [CSX], THE CLAIMANT AND [SAIC]." (R.
339.) In 1985 the predecessor railroads, and in 1990 CSX, filed three separate lawsuits

2

One insurance policy provided:

6.6

THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY UNDER THIS POLICY WITH
RESPECT TO ANY OCCURRENCE SHALL NOT ATTACH UNTIL
THE AMOUNT OF THE APPLICABLE RETAINED OR OTHER
INSURANCE LIMIT HAS BEEN PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF
THE INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH OCCURRENCE. THE
INSURED SHALL MAKE CLAIM FOR ANY LOSS UNDER THIS
POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER:
(A)

THE INSURED SHALL HAVE PAID ULTIMATE NET LOSS
IN EXCESS OF THE RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE
LIMIT WITH RESPECT TO ANY OCCURRENCE, OR

(B)

THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO PAY SUCH AMOUNTS
SHALL HAVE BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL
TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THE INSURED,
THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY.

CLAIM FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE
INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAME OCCURRENCE SHALL
BE SIMILARLY MADE. ALL LOSSES COVERED BY THIS
POLICY SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE COMPANY
WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY CLAIMED
AND PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS
POLICY.
(R. 338-39.) A copy of this policy is contained in the Addendum as Exhibit 13.
5

(the "coverage suits") to collect coverage benefits relating to asbestos exposure under
their SAIC policies.3 (R. 264-65.)
Beginning at least as early as March 1991, CSX and SAIC entered into
negotiations to settle the coverage suits.4 (R. 251-66.) These negotiations were
conducted at arms' length between counsel for CSX and SAIC. (R. 251-66.) From
March 1991 until November 1991, the parties negotiated in good faith and exchanged
approximately seven settlement offers and counteroffers. (R. 251-66.) During the
negotiations, it was acknowledged by CSX and SAIC that future asbestos exposure
claims could be raised by which CSX would suffer losses that were covered by the
policies with SAIC. (R. 258-60.) At the time of the negotiations, SAIC estimated that
covered losses to date approximated $109,000, (R. 258) and, although neither CSX nor
SAIC could then ascertain what CSX's liability for future exposure claims would be, 5

3

Those lawsuits were: The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, et al. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and London Market Insurance Companies, et
a l , Civil No. 85-3162 (D.D.C), (filed Oct. 3, 1985); Western Maryland Railway
Company v. Harbor Insurance Company, et al.. Civil No. 85-3163 (D.D.C.) (filed Oct. 3,
1985); and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Civil No. 9000015R (E.D. Va.) (filed Jan. 11, 1990).
4

Copies of the correspondence demonstrating these negotiations are included in
the Addendum as Exhibits 5 through 12.
5

As acknowledged by the Liquidator's counsel during argument before the trial
court, this uncertainty existed because there could have been asbestos exposure
during the coverage period that would not give rise to asbestosis and claims against
CSX until many years later. As counsel stated,
[Sjome of the occurrences may have been such that we
wouldn't have known, clear back in 1980, just how much
money Southern American would owe. For example, if there
had been a discharge of toxic chemicals, it might not yet be
known what the cleanup costs would be. If there was
exposure to asbestos, the asbestosis may not have yet fully
6

CSX estimated the amount of future losses covered by the SAIC policies would total
$278,700. (R. 259.)
On October 14, 1991, CSX and SAIC reached a coverage settlement agreement
("Agreement") in which CSX released SAIC from all past, present, and future6 claims
that might arise from asbestos litigation. In return, SAIC agreed to pay CSX
$308,000.00 in three installments. The Agreement provided in relevant part:
In settlement of the coverage suits, the parties agree to the
following payment provisions:
1.

Southern will pay CSX the sum of $308,000.00 as follows:
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991
$102,667.00 on November 30, 1991
$102,666.00 on December 31, 1991

This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any claim by CSX
against the policies issued by Southern for any losses due to
Asbestos-Related Claims past, present, or future, whether or
not asserted in the coverage suits.
2.
Southern shall not be liable to pay CSX for losses due
to Asbestos-Related Claims other than as set forth in this
Agreement.

developed. But the occurrence itself would-the occurrence
would've had to have happened in these years.
(R. 642 at 5.)
6

Through the Agreement, SAIC joined the terms of CSX's September 19, 1988
settlement agreement with other insurers. (R. 470-511.) In distinction from SAIC's
Agreement, CSX's settlement with the other insurers did not release CSX's rights to
seek compensation for future losses due to future asbestos exposure claims. (R. 470,
474, 476-483.)
7

(R. 263-66, 470-72 (emphasis added).)7 As agreed, SAIC issued checks to pay CSX in
exchange for the release. In accordance with the settlement, SAIC issued a check for
$102,667.00 on October 28, 1991, a second check for $102,667.00 on November 26,
1991, and a final check for $102,666.00 on January 2, 1992. (R. 267-82.) Likewise, as
agreed, after these payments were made, CSX's claims against SAIC for losses
already incurred related to asbestos exposure were dismissed. (R. 318, 515.) There is
no claim or contention that the settlement payments were made for any reason other
than as part of a fair, equitable settlement. CSX denies that SAIC was insolvent or that
it had any knowledge or belief that SAIC was about to become insolvent. (R. 244.)
SAIC is currently in liquidation pursuant to a Liquidation Order entered on March
26, 1992. (R. 2.) On March 25, 1994, the Liquidator filed the present action against
CSX Corporation, the parent company of CSX Transportation, claiming that the
payments made by SAIC to CSX pursuant to the Agreement were avoidable
preferences and were recoverable from CSX under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(1)(b)
and (c). (R. 4-5.) On February 2, 2000, CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing the
payments were not avoidable preferences as a matter of law upon the following
grounds: (1) the payments were for new and contemporaneous consideration; (2) the
payments were made in the ordinary course of SAIC's business according to usual
business terms and within 45 days of the date they were legally obligated to be paid;
and (3) the payments were not preferences because they were made in exchange for
settlement of claims, including future claims that had not yet accrued, and were not
made on account of any antecedent debt. (R. 188-272.) On March 30, 2000, the

7

A copy of the Agreement is found within Exhibit 12 of the Addendum.
8

Liquidator filed an opposition to CSX's motion and submitted his own motion for
summary judgment, arguing the elements of a preferential transfer under section 31A27-321 existed as a matter of law and addressing the grounds raised in CSX's motion.
(R. 273-309.)
On March 5, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on the cross motions for
summary judgment. (R. 614.) On March 12, 2001, the court issued its memorandum
decision wherein it ruled that the payments to SAIC were not voidable preferences
because they were for new and contemporaneous consideration as a matter of law, (R.
615-628) and, on April 3, 2001, entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of
CSX and denying the Liquidator's motion.8 (R. 615-628.) Because the trial court's
ruling resolved the case in its entirety, the court did not reach the additional issues
before it. (R. 623.) The Liquidator timely appealed from the grant of summary
judgment. (R. 631-32.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court correctly determined that the payments by SAIC were for

new and contemporaneous consideration and not avoidable under the Utah Insurance
Code.
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4) provides that transfers
may not be avoided if made for new and contemporaneous consideration. Under well
settled Utah law, there is consideration when a promisee receives any benefit or a
promisor suffers any detriment. Here CSX gave up its right to prosecute and receive

8

The memorandum decision and order are found in the Addendum to Appellant's
Brief as Exhibit C.

9

full payment on its existing claims and to be compensated for expenses and liability
arising in the future. Consequently, the payments were for new and contemporaneous
consideration.
This Court should reject the Liquidator's arguments that read the "new value"
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code into the Utah Insurance Code. Because the
Legislature chose to use the term "consideration" and rejected the concept of "new
value," the statute requires only consideration as defined by Utah law. Nonetheless,
the Liquidator's arguments, if accepted, are unavailing because CSX gave new value in
exchange for the payments, including allowing SAIC to escape liability and litigation
risks and expenses for claims that could have been asserted against CSX in the future,
which enhanced SAIC's net worth possibly in excess of the amount paid to CSX.
This Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that the consideration was not
new. The benefits SAIC received through the Agreement, including a reduced payoff
on existing claims, saving the expenses and removing the risks of litigation, and
insulating itself from liability for future claims, were only obtained through the
agreement, not before. "New" is tied to consideration such that if there is consideration,
it is by definition new. Further, there is no statutory requirement that consideration be in
the form of goods, services, or money, or that the creditor prove the dollar value of the
benefit conferred upon the insurer by such consideration. Rather, whether the
consideration is sufficient is determined by the insurer's business judgment. Finally,
CSX's future claims are not actually past claims by virtue of the coverage period ending
before the Agreement because CSX and SAIC recognized that exposure to asbestos

10

within the coverage period could lead to asbestosis in the future and CSX had no right
to indemnity under the policies until it actually incurred liabilities and expenses.
Likewise, the Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that the consideration
was not contemporaneous. The payments were required through the same document
that secured the benefits to SAIC, and were made as each corresponding debt was
incurred and as SAIC received the benefits of the Agreement. The Liquidator is
incorrect that a lack of contemporaneity necessarily follows from there having been an
antecedent debt because such interpretation would render section 37A-27-321(4)(a)
meaningless. Further, the debts here were incurred as they were paid and thus were
not antecedent debts and the authority relied upon by the Liquidator is otherwise
inapposite.
Finally, the trial court correctly ruled the payments were not avoidable
notwithstanding the absence of an appraisal affixing the value of the consideration
given by CSX. The Utah Insurance Code requires only that there be consideration, not
a particular amount, and does not provide that a transfer is protected from avoidance
only "to the extent" of the appraised value of the consideration.
II.

Irrespective of whether the payments were for new and contemporaneous

consideration, this Court should affirm summary judgment for CSX on the alternative
grounds raised below because (a) the payments were made in the ordinary course of
SAIC's business, within forty-five days of the debts being incurred, and for debts
incurred according to normal business terms; and (b) the payments were not for
antecedent debts.

11

First, the payments may not be avoided pursuant to the ordinary course of
business exception in Utah Code Ann. § 37A-27-321(4)(b). A debt is not incurred until
the debtor is obligated to make payment. Hence, these debts were incurred as each
payment came due under the Agreement and each payment was made within forty-five
days of coming due. Indeed, the first two payments were made within forty-five days of
the Agreement itself and, because SAIC could not have been obligated to pay CSX's
future claims until CSX's liability and losses were actually incurred, the debts could not
have been incurred prior to execution of the Agreement. Further, because SAIC is an
insurer, the debts were incurred in the ordinary course of SAIC's business of evaluating
insureds' claims, settling those claims, and making payments according to those
settlements. Finally, the debts were incurred and payments made according to normal
business terms because the Agreement was a run-of-the-mill transaction for an insurer
and the payments were made according to the terms of the Agreement. Consequently,
the payments are within the ordinary course of business exception of section 37A-27321(4)(b) and may not be avoided.
Second, the payments are not preferences because they were not for an
antecedent debt. The Agreement insulated SAIC from all liability for CSX's future
losses that had not and could not yet be asserted. These uncertain and unliquidated
claims cannot constitute antecedent debt. Rather, because debts are not incurred until
the debtor is obligated to pay and these payments were made as obligated, the debts
were not antecedent and the payments, therefore, are not preferences.
III.

The proper disposition is to affirm the grant of summary judgment for

CSX. If, however, the Court determines the trial court erred and rejects CSX's alternate
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grounds raised below, the proper disposition is to remand the case without direction so
that the trial court may consider the issues raised but not reached.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE LIQUIDATOR
MAY NOT AVOID SAIC'S PAYMENTS TO CSX BECAUSE SAIC MADE THE
PAYMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSIDERATION.
A.

Under the Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, SAIC's
Payments to CSX Constitute New and Contemporaneous
Consideration and May Not Be Avoided.

This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment because it
correctly determined that the payments to CSX were for new and contemporaneous
consideration. Section 31A-27-321(4)'s plain language provides that SAIC's payments
are not avoidable preferences because they were made in exchange for new and
contemporaneous consideration.9 "This court looks first to the plain language of a
statute when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and assumes that each term
was used advisedly by the Legislature." Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT
110, U14, 993 P.2d 875. "Only if we find some ambiguity1101 need we look further."
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). This Court gives
effect to each term used by the Legislature "according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." Utah State Bar v. Summerhaves & Havden, Pub. Adjusters. 905 P.2d 867,
871 (Utah 1995).

9

As discussed below, the Liquidator ignores the plain language of the statute,
arguing instead that this Court should construe the statute to effect the purposes of the
federal Bankruptcy Code, which uses different language.
10

The Liquidator has pointed to no ambiguity in the statute's use of "a new and
contemporaneous consideration." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(a).
13

"Consideration" is: "The cause, motive, price or impelling influence which
induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a
contract. Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the
other." Blacks Law Dictionary 306 (6th Ed. 1990); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v.
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 859 (Utah 1998) ("'Consideration is "an act or promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for a promise."'") (citation omitted). This Court has
expressly stated that "consideration may be found 'whenever a promisor receives a
benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however slight,'" In re Estate of
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted) (alteration in original), and
has long held that a release or settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim provides
sufficient consideration for a binding agreement. See Browning v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc, 72 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1937); see also Wood Realty Trust v. N. Storonslee
Cooperage Co., 646 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("Discontinuance of a
pending action, release or promise to forego future litigation can constitute valid
consideration.").
CSX gave valuable new consideration in exchange for the payments. Such
consideration included accepting payment in an amount lower than that to which CSX
was initially entitled, losing its right to obtain enforceable judgments, appeal any errors
occurring at trial, and to obtain writs of execution on those judgments. In so doing, CSX
gave SAIC the significant benefit of resolving the claims, avoiding judgments being
entered against it, and saving the expense of litigation. Moreover, SAIC removed its
liability for all claims encompassed within the coverage period that could have been
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brought in the future. Under Utah law, this constitutes new and contemporaneous
consideration precluding the Liquidator from avoiding the payments.11
Indeed, CSX's agreement with SAIC satisfies the definition of "consideration"
provided by the Utah Insurance Code through its definition of "fair consideration":
"Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation:
(i)
when in exchange for the property or an obligation, as
a fair equivalent for it, and in good faith:
(A)
property is conveyed;
(B)
services are rendered;
(C)
an obligation is incurred; or
(D)
an antecedent debt is satisfied;
(ii)
when the property or obligation is received in good
faith to secure a present advance or an antecedent debt in
amount not disproportionately small compared to the value
of the property or obligation obtained.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-102(1)(h) (Supp. 1999). By parsing out the language
defining "fair," this subsection shows a definition of "consideration" that encompasses
the instant facts because CSX incurred an obligation—e.g., CSX must release current
and future claims and accept reduced payment— and satisfied an antecedent
debt—e.g., canceling the original debt owed for claims under the policies. See Utah
State Bar, 905 P.2d at 871 ("[W]ords and phrases used in a statute, if also defined by

11

Even under the narrower language used by the Bankruptcy Code, it has been
held that a release of claims and termination of a lawsuit through a settlement
agreement may be "new value" precluding the payment in a contemporaneous
exchange from being avoided. See Lewis v. Diethorn. 893 F.2d 648, 650 (3rd Cir.
1990); Nelson Co. v. Amquip Corp.. 128 B.R. 930, 935 n.13 (E.D. Pa 1991) (stating
transfer was contemporaneous exchange for new value and explaining "[defendant]
exchanged $349,734.32 in principal for $291,712.46 in principal, plus the bonus of a
litigation free environment (or so it thought, until [debtor] sought to avoid the transfer)");
cf. In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co.. 911 F.2d 1223, 1238 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that "equivalent value" demonstrating transfer was not fraudulent under Bankruptcy
Code § 548 "could be the release of a just claim against the corporation"). As the Lewis
court explained, what the party received "was not the freedom from liability on an
antecedent debt, but the freedom from the risk of litigation." Lewis, 893 F.2d at 650.
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statute, must be construed according to that definition.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-311 (1993)). Such definition is in accordance with settled Utah case law defining
consideration.
Accordingly, it is clear that the trial court correctly determined that the payments
to CSX were for new and contemporaneous consideration and this Court should affirm
the grant of summary judgment for CSX.
B.

This Court Must Reject the Liquidator's Flawed Analysis That Defeats
the Statute's Plain Language by Writing in New Requirements from
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.

The Liquidator ignores the statute's language and instead relies erroneously on
bankruptcy cases interpreting the different language of the Bankruptcy Code to argue
there was no new and contemporaneous consideration exchanged for the payments.
The Utah Code, however, provides that payments may not be avoided if they were for
"new and contemporaneous consideration," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(a) (1999)
(emphasis added), whereas the Bankruptcy Code describes the limit on avoidance as
"a contemporaneous exchange for new value." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1) (West 1993)
(emphasis added). This Court must respect the Legislature's decision to use the word
"consideration" and may not accept the Liquidator's invitation to rewrite the statute
according to the language used in the Bankruptcy Code.12

12

CSX agrees with the Liquidator that the preference statute serves the general
purpose of ensuring that one creditor does not receive a share of the liquidation estate
disproportionate to that received by similarly situated creditors. Nonetheless, the
Legislature has balanced the competing interests and implemented the best
mechanism in its judgment to achieve such purpose. The Legislature determined that a
creditor does not receive a disproportionate share if it provides consideration for the
transfer. Hence, the Legislature determined that the liquidation estate is not diminished
to the detriment of other creditors because the estate receives the new consideration
and entrusted the decision of whether the consideration is sufficient to warrant the deal
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Section 31A-27-321 is analogous to the Bankruptcy Code.13 However, the
Legislature chose to describe the preference avoidance exception of section 31A-27321(4)(a) as requiring "consideration," a term of art, rather than "value" as used in the
Bankruptcy Code.14 Such usage clearly demonstrates an intent to reject the Bankruptcy
Code's "value" requirements and instead require only "consideration" with its
concomitant meaning. As this Court stated, "statutory construction presumes that the
expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Biddje,
1999 UT 110, at IT 14; see also Westside Community Sch. v. Merqens. 496 U.S. 226,
242 (1990) ("Congress was presumably aware that [this language], as used by the
Court, is a term of art, and had it intended to import that concept into the act, one would
suppose that it would have done so explicitly. Indeed, Congress' deliberate choice to
use a different term . . . can only mean that it intended to establish a [different]
standard . . . .") (citation omitted). The Legislature's intent is underscored by the fact
that in section 321, a mere three subparts following the language at issue, the

to the sound business judgment of the insurer.
13

The Utah Insurance Code expressly recognizes the Bankruptcy Code. See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-411 (1999) (providing for severability when statute is
superseded by the federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
14

The Bankruptcy Code describes the avoidance exception as follows:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer (1) to the extent that such transfer was (A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange . . . .

11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West 1993). A copy of section 547 is included in the Addendum
as Exhibit 4.
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Legislature described another limit on avoiding preferences using the term "value"
instead of "consideration," demonstrating that "consideration" in Utah's statute is distinct
from "value" in the Bankruptcy Code and that the Legislature is competent to choose
statutory language advisedly. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(d).
As recognized by one of the authorities on which the Liquidator relies, In Re
Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), the language "value" in
section 547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, is narrowly defined and "demands a more
exacting or rigid measure of benefit conferred on the debtor." Jd. at 138 (recognizing
that "value" for purposes of § 547(c)(1) is manifestly narrower than the definition for
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 548, which concerns fraudulent conveyances). This rigor does
not apply to the meaning of "consideration" used in the statute at issue here.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code expressly defines the requisite new value to
exclude an obligation substituted for an existing obligation, i.e., a settlement agreement.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(2) (West 1993) (providing that "new value . . . does not
include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation"); In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc.,
55 B.R. 371, 376-77 (N.D. III. 1985) (stating that this definition excluded a stipulation to
refrain temporarily from pursuing a lawsuit). Utah's Insurance Code contains no such
limitation.
Finally, the Agreement would even satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's requirement of
new value. Prior to the Agreement, CSX had claims approximating $109,000. With
respect to those claims, through the Agreement, SAIC saved the costs of litigation and
benefited, inter alia, from removal of the risk that a judgment would be entered against
it. In addition, at the time of the agreement, both SAIC and CSX knew there would
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likely be future claims asserted against CSX that would be covered by the SAIC
policies. CSX estimated SAIC could be liable for $278,700, and the actual amount
could have been higher. In exchange for SAIC's payments, under the Agreement,
SAIC escaped this liability as well as any costs it would have incurred in a subsequent
action brought by CSX. Irrespective of the benefit SAIC received with respect to past
and present claims, such liability and costs regarding future claims alone could have
surpassed the $308,000 paid to CSX, and the Agreement thus correspondingly
enhanced SAIC's liquidation estate. Hence, even under the Bankruptcy Code, the
payments were for "new value" and are not avoidable preferences.
In sum, under the plain language used by the Legislature, the payments may not
be avoided by the Liquidator because they were exchanged for new and
contemporaneous consideration. As used by the Utah Insurance Code, only
consideration—not the Bankruptcy Code's concept of new value—is required and the
settlement agreement here constituted such new and contemporaneous consideration.
Nonetheless, even under the Bankruptcy Code, the payments were for new value and
are not avoidable preferences. Consequently, as a matter of law, the payments may
not be avoided and this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX.
C.

The Consideration Exchanged by CSX for the Payments Was "New"
and "Contemporaneous,"

This Court should reject the Liquidator's strained argument by which he asserts
that the consideration given by CSX in exchange for the payments was neither new nor
contemporaneous.
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1.

The Consideration Given by CSX Was "New."

The Liquidator argues that although the Agreement was supported by
consideration, SAIC received nothing "new." This argument is a complete red herring.
Before the Agreement, CSX had the right to prosecute its existing claims against SAIC,
obtain a judgment, and execute on that judgment. CSX further had a right to seek
compensation from SAIC for liability and expenses on all new asbestos exposure
claims as they were incurred. After the Agreement, CSX had no such rights, SAIC
escaped the costs of defending the previously pending actions, and SAIC removed all
of its responsibility for CSX's future liability and expenses. Because SAIC received
these significant benefits only through the Agreement in exchange for the payments,
the consideration was new.
Indeed, by admitting that there was consideration, the Liquidator necessarily
admits it was new because there simply is no consideration without it being new.
"Events which occur prior to the making of the promise and not with the purpose of
inducing the promise in exchange are viewed as 'past consideration' and are the legal
equivalent of 'no consideration.'" Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 633
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 210 (1963)); accord
Jensen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366, 368 (1970) ("The doctrine that
past consideration is no consideration represents the overwhelming weight of authority
and is almost universally followed. This has been the law since early times.'") (citation
omitted). Hence, "new" is inexorably intertwined with whether consideration itself exists.
If there was nothing "new" obtained by SAIC through the Agreement, there was by
definition no consideration and, conversely, if there was consideration, it was by

20

definition "new." Consequently, because, as described above, CSX provided
consideration for the Agreement in exchange for the payments, by definition the
consideration was new.
The Liquidator's argument that the consideration provided by CSX must
measurably enhance SAIC's net worth in terms of goods, services, or money is without
support. There is no such requirement in the statute. First, unlike the Bankruptcy
Code,15 the Utah statute does not require "new and contemporaneous goods, services,
or money." Second, the statute requires only that there be consideration, not
"sufficient" consideration to enhance the estate in the eyes of the liquidation court.
Indeed, such a requirement would be antithetical to Utah law under which courts will not
pass on the sufficiency of consideration provided consideration exists. See In re Estate
of Beeslev. 883 P.2d at 1351 ("[Consideration may be found 'whenever a promisor
receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however slight/") (citation
omitted) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added); Dementas. 764 P.2d at 632
(u'[A]s a general rule it is settled that any detriment no matter how economically
inadequate will support a promise.'") (citation omitted). Ensuring it would not have to
compensate CSX in the future for claims not yet asserted but arising during the

15

The Bankruptcy Code defines "new value" as
money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or
release by a transferee of property previously transferred to
such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor
voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable
law, including proceeds of such property, but does not
include an obligation substituted for an existing
obligation . . . .

11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(2) (West 1993) (emphasis added).

21

coverage period was a benefit to SAIC.16 The record shows that CSX estimated its
future covered losses could exceed $278,000. Whether the benefit to CSX justified
making the payments in a business sense was SAIC's decision and should not be
second-guessed by the courts. See, e.g., Dementas, 764 P.2d at 632 ("If Tallas
thought it was worth 50,000 bucks to get one ride to Bingham, that's Tallas'
decision . . . . The only thing you can't do is take it with you.'").
The Liquidator states that no future claims could have arisen after the
Agreement because the coverage period ended in 1982. This is simply not true. The
Agreement was not a mere payment plan for CSX's past claims. As the Liquidator's
counsel recognized during oral argument before the trial court, at the time of the
Agreement, a person could have been exposed to asbestos within the coverage period
yet not develop asbestosis for many years. If that person brought an action against
CSX after execution of the Agreement, because of the Agreement SAIC would not have
to reimburse CSX for the liability and costs incurred through that action, despite that the
liability and costs would be covered by the policies. Further, just as the asbestosexposed potential plaintiff could not bring an action against CSX until some injury could
be shown, CSX could not seek reimbursement under the policy until liability and costs
were actually incurred. See, e.g., In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10 th Cir.
1986) (M[A] debt is incurred when a debtor first becomes legally obligated to pay . . . .");
Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997) (holding
cause of action did not accrue until damages were incurred and stating, "The true test

16

CSX gave SAIC the right to enforce CSX's forebearance from pursuing its
claims. CSX did not unilaterally choose to forebear enforcement and thus was not
"merely exercising a pre-existing right." (Appellant's Br. at 14.)
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in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when
the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.'") (citation
omitted); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 & n.3 (Utah 1981) (M[T]he general rule is
that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action.").
Consequently, the record is clear that the trial court correctly concluded that the
payments were for new consideration.
2.

The Consideration Given by CSX Was "Contemporaneous."

The consideration given by CSX was clearly contemporaneous. The payments
were required to be made in the very document securing the benefit for SAIC, and the
payments were made shortly thereafter as each debt was incurred and as SAIC
secured the right to enforce the Agreement. Because SAIC received the benefit of the
Agreement and the corresponding enhancement to its net worth as the payments were
made, no delay defeated the legitimate expectations of other creditors and the
consideration was therefore contemporaneous. See PineTop Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am.
Natl Trust &Sav.Ass'n.. 969 F.2d 321, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that transfers
were contemporaneous under Illinois liquidation statute and therefore were not
avoidable transfers): cf. In re Stephens, 242 B.R. 508, 511 & n.2 (D. Kan. 1999)
(affirming ruling, in bankruptcy context, that exchange was contemporaneous and
transfer not avoidable and stating that "'[contemporaneous' is defined as 'existing or
occurring during the same time (as during a year, decade, or longer span of time)' or
'originating, arising, or being formed or made at the same time: marked by
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characteristics compatible with such origin.'") (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary (1961)).
The Liquidator's argument that if a payment was for an antecedent debt it ipso
facto is not contemporaneous consideration turns the statute on its head. As discussed
below, these payments were payments on the debts created by the Agreement that
were incurred as each payment came due, not for the original claims on the policies,
and thus were not for antecedent debts. See infra, Part II.B. Further, even if they were
on account of an antecedent debt, that inquiry is only a prima facie requirement for
classifying a payment as a "preference." Although there is overlap between the two
concepts, once a payment is classified as a preference, the statute still allows a
defense to avoidance if, although on account of an antecedent debt, it is made for new
and contemporaneous consideration. Hence, the Liquidator's analysis must be rejected
because it would effectively repeal this statutory defense in its entirety. See Schurtz v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991) (rejecting interpretation of
statute that would effectively read out another subpart of statute and stating "the
general rule that we should construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all
their terms, where possible").
Finally, even assuming that the cases on which the Liquidator relies to argue the
consideration was not contemporaneous interpreted the same language used by the
Utah Insurance Code, they are factually inapposite and do not stand for the proposition
that a formalized enforceable agreement to release existing and future claims and
accept sums lower than those currently due cannot constitute new and
contemporaneous consideration. In each case, the payments at issue were made on
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an old debt whereas SAIC's payments were made for a new bargain. In particular, the
Liquidator's reliance on In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc. is misplaced because there the
creditor merely delayed its suit temporarily, providing no other value to the debtor,
whereas here there was an express agreement wherein SAIC specifically bargained for
the forebearance and other consideration. See In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. at
376; see also In re Barefoot, 952 F.2d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding subsequent
payment to make good a bad check, without such payment being required by
subsequent settlement agreement containing new consideration, was not a
contemporaneous exchange); In re Pan Trading Corp., 125 B.R. 869, 875-76 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding, without addressing contemporaneity, that payment on debt
was not for new value in case where no subsequent settlement agreement was
entered).
In sum, the Liquidator's arguments that the consideration was not
contemporaneous are without merit. The payments by SAIC were clearly made for new
and contemporaneous consideration given to SAIC and the trial court therefore
correctly granted summary judgment for CSX. Accordingly, this Court should affirm.
D.

The Court Correctly Ruled the Payments Were for New and
Contemporaneous Consideration Without an Appraisal of the Future
Claims Released by CSX.

This Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that an appraisal is required to
find new and contemporaneous consideration under section 31A-27-321(4)(a) of the
Utah Code. (Appellant's Br. Part IV.) The Liquidator cites no Utah authority to support
his argument, including the statute itself. Again, the statute provides, "The receiver
may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for or because of: (a) a new and
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contemporaneous consideration . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4). The Code
simply contains no requirement that the consideration exchanged be appraised and
weighed by a court to assess whether, in the court's view, it was sufficient to justify the
exchange. Such weighing of the sufficiency of consideration by a court is inappropriate.
See In re Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1351; Dementas, 764 P.2d at 632. Under
Utah's Insurance Code, the question is only if there is consideration, not how much.
The bankruptcy cases relied upon by the Liquidator are inapposite as interpreting
distinct language of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code provides, "The trustee
may not avoid under this section a transfer - (1) to the extent that such transfer was intended . . . to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value . . . ." 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 547(c) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Clearly, under this language, Congress
requires bankruptcy courts to assess how much new value was provided to a debtor in
exchange for a transfer. The language explicitly provides that a preference is insulated
from avoidance only to the extent of the new value; the Utah Code has no
corresponding provision. In distinction, the Utah Code asks only the yes or no question:
Was the transfer for consideration? If the answer is yes, as it is here, the transfer may
not be voided.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that CSX gave new and
contemporaneous consideration and that the payments may not be avoided as a matter
of law notwithstanding the absence of an appraisal. Consequently, this Court should
affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX.
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II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CSX IS WARRANTED AS A MATTER
OF LAW UPON THE REMAINING GROUNDS ASSERTED BY CSX BELOW.
The trial court correctly determined the payments to CSX were for new and

contemporaneous consideration. Nonetheless, this Court should affirm the grant of
summary judgment also based upon the additional grounds raised by CSX below. It is
well settled that this Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." Higqins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Moreover, for this Court to do so, it is not
necessary for CSX to have brought a cross-appeal. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Able
Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69,1J7, 983 P.2d 575. Consequently, summary judgment should
be affirmed because the payments to CSX were (a) made within forty-five days after a
debt was incurred, for a debt incurred in the ordinary course of SAIC's insurance
business, and for a debt incurred according to normal business terms; and (b) not for
an antecedent debt.
A.

The Payments May Not Be Avoided Because They Were Made In The
Ordinary Course Of SAIC's Insurance Business As Payment Of Debts
Within Forty-Five Days Of Their Incurrence And According To Normal
Business Terms.

The liquidator may not avoid the payments because they were made within fortyfive days after the debts were incurred, they were made for debts incurred in the
ordinary course of SAIC's insurance business, and because they were incurred
according to normal business terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(b) (1999).
Section 31A-27-321 of the Utah Insurance Code provides that the Liquidator
"may not avoid a transfer" of "the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a
debt incurred in the ordinary course of the business of the insurer and according to
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normal business terms." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(b) (1996). Because SAIC's
payments to CSX meet each of these elements, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover
them and this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX.
First, each payment was made within forty-five days of the date it was due under
the Agreement. A debt is "incurred" as of the date the debtor is legally obligated to pay
it. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Pan Trading
Corp., 125 B.R. at 875; In re Caceres Johnson P. R., 91 B.R. 200, 202 (D.P.R. 1988);
In re Energy COOP.. 103 B.R. 171, 174 (N.D. III. 1986). In In re White River, the 10th
Circuit examined the similar exception in the Bankruptcy Code17 to determine when
debts for monthly payments due under a lease were incurred. The court rejected the
trustee's argument that the entire debt was incurred upon execution of the lease. As
the court stated: "[T]he debt was not incurred when the lease obligation was executed
because the total lease obligation was not then due and payable. We hold that the
debts were incurred under the lease in monthly increments on the actual dates the rent
was due." In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633.
Similarly here, the debts were not incurred when the policies were issued nor
when a potential claimant was exposed to asbestos because under the policies' terms
SAIC had no obligation to make payment until CSX had actually incurred liability and
expenses with respect to each individual claimant. Further, the debts were not incurred
upon the signing of the Agreement because SAIC was not then obligated to pay.

17

The 45 day requirement was removed from the Bankruptcy Code by a 1984
amendment. The In re White River Corp. court considered the statute in effect before
that amendment. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 632 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
547(c)(2)(B) (1982)).
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Rather, the debts for which the payments were made were incurred when actually due
under the Agreement. Thus, under the terms of the Agreement, SAIC incurred debts to
CSX on October 31, 1991, November 30, 1991 and December 31, 1991. See also In re
Gold Coast Seed Co., 751 F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Iowa Premium Serv..
695 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc). SAIC met its legal obligations and
made the payments of the debts on October 28, 1991, November 26, 1991 and
January 2, 1992, respectively, clearly within the forty-five-day limit imposed by the
insurance code. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633 (holding "that a transfer
occurs upon delivery of the check."); see also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 402
n.9, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1391 n.9 (1992) (noting "[t]hose Courts of Appeals to have
considered the issue are unanimous in concluding that a date of delivery rule should
apply to check payments for purposes of § 547(c)"). Consequently, SAIC paid each of
its three debts to CSX within forty-five days after incurring them.
Further, even if the debt arose upon entry of the Agreement, the first two
payments are not avoidable as being made within forty-five days after the debt was
incurred. The payments were not made for the original claims brought by CSX; such
claims were enforceably abandoned when CSX entered the Agreement with SAIC.
Rather, the payments were made upon the Agreement dated October 14, 1991. To
form a contract there must be "'[a]n acceptance [that] unconditionally assent[s] to all
material terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance/"
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100,^27, 989 P.2d 1077.
Unconditional assent to all material terms did not occur until execution of the October
14, 1991 letter. In the October 14, 1991 Agreement, signed by CSX on October 17,
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1991 and by SAIC on October 25, 1991, the parties entered a formal settlement
agreement resolving their claims and providing for payment on given days for fixed
amounts. Consequently, at the earliest, the new debt arose on October 14, 1991. As a
result, assuming the debts were incurred at that time, the two initial payments made
October 28, 1991 and November 26, 1991 were made within forty-five days after the
debt was incurred.
Second, the debts were incurred and payments were made under the Agreement
in the ordinary course of SAIC's business as an insurer. The "ordinary course of
business" refers to a company's normal or standard business practices. SAIC, as an
insurance company since 1934, has long been in the business of providing insurance
coverage and making payments in settlement of the claims of its insureds. The
settlement with CSX was no different than the no doubt thousands of similar
settlements made by SAIC throughout its history. Thus, SAIC made the payments in
the ordinary course of its business as an insurer.
Debts pursuant to settlement agreements are not per se outside the ordinary
course of business. While this may be true in the cases the Liquidator relied upon
below wherein the debtor's ordinary course of business did not involve regularly paying
disputed claims, it is not true in the insurance industry for which the heart of its ordinary
course of business is to review, settle, and pay claims for insurance. See, e.g.. In re
Valley Steel Prods. Co., 214 B.R. 202, 207 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (debt for unpaid taxes was
not in steel company's ordinary course of business); In re Florence Tanners, Inc., 184
B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (settlement for sexual discrimination lawsuit
was not within ordinary course of debtor's business). Rather, determining whether a
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debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business requires an examination of the
practices in that particular industry; merely because a debt is not typically incurred by
most industries does not foreclose it from being incurred in the ordinary course of
business with the individual industry at issue. See Fidelity Sav. & Inv. Co. v. New Hope
Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 1989). Hence, because SAIC was in the
insurance business and the insurance business necessarily entails evaluating claims by
insureds, settling those claims, and making payments on those new debts incurred
through settlement, the debts here were clearly incurred in the ordinary scope of SAIC's
business.
Finally, the debts were incurred and payments were made according to normal
business terms. In this case, the Agreement, the negotiations between SAIC and CSX
as evidenced by the parties' correspondence, and the payments themselves indicate
nothing other than a regular, fair and proper settlement. See Fidelity Sav. & Inv. Co. v.
New Hope Baptist. 880 F.2d 1172, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1989) (transfers not voidable
under Bankruptcy Code; they were "conducted in a regular manner, pursuant to the
terms of the certificates, and without any indication that the corporation was having
financial difficulties"). Again, because an insurance company is engaged in the
business of reviewing claims, settling claims, and making payments for debts
established through such settlement agreements, the payments here were necessarily
within the normal terms of those engaged in by SAIC. At a minimum, they were within
the permissible range necessary to establish that the payments may not be avoided.
See In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 220 (3rd Cir. 1994) ("'"[OJrdinary
business terms" refers to the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which
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firms similar in some general way to the creditor in question engage and that only
dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range should be deemed
extraordinary and therefore outside the scope of [normal business terms]."') (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). The payments were made exactly as provided for in the
Agreement, and it is plain that normal business terms were followed in the Agreement.
In sum, because SAIC made the payments in the ordinary course of its
insurance business, according to normal business terms and within forty-five days of
incurring its debts to CSX, as a matter of law, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover
the payments. Consequently, on this independent ground, this Court should affirm the
grant of summary judgment for CSX.
B.

The Payments May Not Be Avoided Because They Were Not For An
Antecedent Debt.

Finally, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover the payments because the
payments were made as settlement of claims, including future claims, and were not
made on account of any antecedent debt. For a payment to be avoidable under the
Utah Insurance Code, it must have been "for or on account of an antecedent debt."
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(1)(a) (1996). If not made to satisfy such antecedent or
pre-existing debt, the payment is not a "preference" as defined by the statute and is not
avoidable or recoverable. See id. It is undisputed that the terms of the Agreement
release SAIC from liability "for any losses due to Asbestos-Related Claims past,
present, or future, whether or not asserted in the coverage suits." By its plain terms, the
Agreement incorporates a release of future claims - that is, claims that have not yet
arisen, could not yet have arisen, and may never in fact actually arise. No stretch of
logic could make such contingent, unrealized potential claims into "antecedent debt"
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within the meaning of the statute. Such potential claims cannot be pre-existing and are
thus not "antecedent."18 Therefore, the payments were not made for any antecedent
debt and thus are not preferential transfers.
The Liquidator erroneously asserts that the payments were made for an
antecedent debt. In arguing the payments were not for contemporaneous
consideration, the Liquidator argues that the debts arose when CSX first had a claim for
payment against SAIC although such claim may be contingent, unmatured, or
unliquidated. Even assuming the debts were based solely on the original policy, the
payments here were not made for any debt thereunder. Rather, the payments were
made in satisfaction of the debt created by the Agreement.
In Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648 (3rd Cir. 1990), the debtor entered a
settlement agreement with a creditor regarding a debt for work it performed. See id. at
649. The creditor agreed to discontinue suit, remove a lis pendens, and make a
payment. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the payment. kL The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, concluded that the payment does not meet the statutory preference
requirements because "it was not 'for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made.'" jd. at 650 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2)).
Consequently, the court determined that the settlement agreement, in exchange for the

18

The Liquidator asserts that because CSX is within the definition of a "creditor"
any payment must have been for an antecedent debt. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) In fact,
however, there is no connection between the two; the statute separately defines a
creditor and what constitutes a preference and does not provide that any payment is for
an antecedent debt merely because it was made to a creditor. Rather, the statute
requires examination of the particular payments at issue and whether they were
specifically for an antecedent debt. Hence, even if CSX's original claims under the
policy can be considered antecedent debt, the payments here were not for that debt but
rather for the new Agreement wherein CSX released future claims.
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payment, gave the debtor freedom from the risk of litigation and an increase in the
value of his property when the lis pendens was lifted. See id. Thus, there was no
antecedent debt from which it sprung, but rather, the old debt was cancelled and the
settlement agreement formed a new debt which was satisfied by the payment. See id.
Similarly here, the original claims under the policy were canceled via the Agreement
and the Agreement gave rise to new debts the payment of which do not constitute
preferences.19 See also In re Anthony Sicari, Inc., 144 B.R. 656, 662 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding payment was not a preference because it was "not payment on an
antecedent debt, but in settlement of pending litigation").
This principle is underscored by viewing statutes of limitation. When a party
brings suit on a claim but then enters into a settlement agreement, dismissing his suit
with prejudice, another subsequent suit for breach of that settlement agreement is not
barred simply because the original limitation period has ended. Rather, because that
person would have a new action under the settlement agreement for its breach by
failure to pay the debt created by the settlement agreement, the person may chose
either to rescind the agreement (provided the limitations period has not run and he can
still sue on the original claim) or he may sue under the new agreement within its new
limitations period. See Butcher v. Gilrov, 744 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

19

The Liquidator correctly notes "'that a debt is incurred when a debtor first
becomes legally obligated to pay . . . ."' (Appellant's Br. at 20 n.5 (quoting In re White
River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986)).) Because SAIC could not have been
obligated to pay claims for CSX's losses on then-unknown potential cases, such
obligations did not exist before the Agreement and thus cannot be considered
antecedent.
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(holding that action for breach of settlement agreement accrued at time the terms of the
agreement were breached).
Accordingly, it is clear that the debts for which SAIC made the payments were
newly incurred through the Agreement when they came due under the Agreement. The
payments, therefore, were not for antecedent debts and thus cannot be avoided by the
trustee. Consequently, on this independent ground, this Court should affirm the grant
of summary judgment for CSX.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REMAND FOR ENTRY OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE LIQUIDATOR.
The Liquidator erroneously asserts that acceptance of his arguments requires

remand for entry of summary judgment in his favor. (Appellant's brief at 10.) As
explained above, however, even if this Court determines the trial court erred with
respect to the new and contemporaneous consideration defense, this Court should still
affirm summary judgment on the additional grounds raised by CSX below. In the event,
however, this Court also rejects those grounds, the case should be remanded without
direction to enter summary judgment in the Liquidator's favor so that the trial court may
address the issues not previously reached. Indeed, the denial of the Liquidator's
motion alone would not be a final order within the purview of this Court's appellate
jurisdiction. See Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah
1977); R.F. Chase, Annotation, Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary
Judgment, 15 A.L.R. 3d 899, at 902-03 (1967 & Supp. 2001) (and authority cited
therein) ("The vast majority of cases that have ruled upon the question whether an
order denying a motion for summary judgment is reviewable by appeal or writ of error
have held against such review.").
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX. First, the trial
court correctly ruled that the Agreement provided new and contemporaneous
consideration as a matter of law and that this forecloses the Liquidator's ability to avoid
the payments. Further, this Court should affirm upon the alternate grounds raised
below. That is, summary judgment was proper because the payments were received
for debts incurred in the ordinary course of business within forty-five days of being
incurred and according to normal business terms. Further, the payments were for debts
arising via the Agreement that were incurred as each payment became due, and thus
were not transfers pursuant to an antecedent debt and are not preferences within the
scope of the statute.
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History: C. 1953, 31A-26-302, e n a c t e d by
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A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amend-
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ment, effective April 30, 2001, made a stylistic
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31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
C o n s t r u c t i o n and application.
This section and the rules promulgated under it do not give rise to a private cause of

action. Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000
UT App 10, 994 R2d 824, cert, denied, 4 R3d
1289 (Utah 2000).
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LIQUIDATION
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31A-27-310.
31A-27-311.5.
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Section
31A-27-102.
31A-27-104.
31A-27-110.

Definitions.
Injunctions and orders.
Immunity and indemnification of the receiver.
Part III

31A-27-323.
31A-27-328.
31A-27-332.
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Filing of claims,
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Formal Proceedings
31A-27-307.
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PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
31A-27-101. Scope, purpose, and construction.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Davister Corp. v. United Republic
Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998),

31A-27-102.

cert, denied, 525 U.S. 1177, 119 S. Ct. 1112,143
L. Ed. 2d 108 (1999).

Definitions.

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Alien insurer domiciled in Utah" means an insurer domiciled
outside the United States whose entry into the United States is through
Utah.
(b) "Ancillary state" means any state other than an insurer's state of
domicile.
(c) "Contingent claims" means a claim or demand upon which:
(i) a right of action has accrued at the date of the order of
liquidation; and
(ii) liability has not been determined.
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(d) "Date of liquidation*' means the date of the filing of a petition for
liquidation that results in an order for liquidation.
(e) "Delinquency proceeding" means any:
(i) proceeding commenced against an insurer for the purpose of
liquidating, rehabilitating, reorganizing, or conserving the insurer;
and
(ii) summary proceeding under Sections 31A-27-201 through 31A27-203.
(f) "Domestic insurer" includes, for puiposes of this chapter, foreign
insurers commercially domiciled in this state under Section 31 A-14-206.
(g) (i) "Estate" or "property of the estate" means:
(A) all legal or equitable interests of an insurer that are the
subject of a rehabilitation, liquidation, conservation, or other
proceeding under this chapter in property as of the date of filing
of the petition for rehabilitation, liquidation, or conservation;
(B) any interest in property recoverable by the receiver under
the provisions of this title;
(C) any interest in property acquired after the date of filing of
the petition; and
(D) all proceeds, products, rents, and profits from this property,
(ii) "Estate" or "property of the estate" includes property in which
the insurer holds only legal title, but no equitable interest, only to the
extent of the insolvent insurer's interest,
(h) "Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation:
(i) when in exchange for the property or obligation, as a fair
equivalent for it, and in good faith:
(A) property is conveyed;
(B) services are rendered;
(C) an obligation is incurred; or
(D) an antecedent debt is satisfied; or
(ii) when the property or obligation is received in good faith to
secure a present advance or an antecedent debt in amount not
disproportionately small compared to the value of the property or
obligation obtained,
(i) (i) "General assets" means all property not encumbered by a security
agreement for the security or benefit of specified persons or classes of
persons.
(ii) "General assets" does not include separate account assets under
Section 31A-5-217.
(iii) For encumbered property, "general assets" includes all t h a t ,
property or its proceeds which is in excess of the amount necessary to
discharge the sums secured by the property.
(iv) Assets held in trust or on deposit for the security or benefit of
all policyholders, or all policyholders and creditors, in more than a
single state, are general assets,
(j) "Guaranty association" means:
(i) the applicable association under Chapter 28; or
(ii) the similar association under the laws of another state,
(k) "Immature claim" means a claim or demand upon which payment is
due, except for the passage of time.
(1) "Insolvency" has the same meaning as in Section 31A-1-30L
(m) "Insurer" means any person who is doing, has done, purports to do,
or is licensed to do an insurance business on its own account and is or has
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been subject to the authority of, or to liquidation, rehabilitation, reorganization, or supervision by, a commissioner. A separate account created
under Section 31A-5-217 is an "insurer" for purposes of Chapter 27,
(n) "Preferred claim" means any claim that the law gives priority of
payment from the general assets of the insurer
(o) "Receiver" means receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator, or conservator,
as the context requires.
(p) "Reciprocal state" means any state other than this state:
(i) in which in substance Subsection 31A-27-310(l), Subsections
31A-27-403U) and (3), Sections 31A-27-404 and 31A-27-406 through
31A-27-409 are in force;
(iD which has laws requiring the commissioner to be the receiver of
a delinquent insurer; and
(iii) which has laws for the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances
and preferential transfers by the receiver of a delinquent insurer.
(q) "Secured claim" means any claim secured by mortgage, trust deed,
security agreement, pledge, deposit as security, escrow or otherwise, but
not including special deposit claims. The term also includes claims that
have become liens upon specific assets through judicial processes.
(r) "Separate account assets" means those assets allocated to separate
accounts under Section 31A-5-217.
(s) "Special deposit claim" means any claim secured by a deposit in trust
made pursuant to this title for the security or benefit of one or more
limited classes of persons.
(t) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property. The
retention of a security interest in or title to property delivered to a debtor
is considered a transfer by the debtor.
(u) "Unliquidated claim" means a claim or demand upon which:
(i) a right of action has accrued at the date of the order of
liquidation; and
(ii) liability has been established but the amount of which has not
been determined.
(2) If the subject of a rehabilitation or liquidation proceeding under this
chapter is an insurer engaged in a surety business, then as used in this
chapter:
(a) "Policy" includes a bond issued by a surety.
(b) "Policyholder" includes a principal on a bond.
(c) "Beneficiary" includes an obligee of a bond.
(d) "Insured" includes both the principal and obligee of a bond.
History: C. 1953, 31 A-27-102, e n a c t e d by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 222;
1996 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 55: 1999, ch. 131,
§ 26.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted u Section 31A-l-30r for "Subsection 31A-1-30K39)"
in Subsection (1X1), designated subsections,
and made stylistic changes.

31A-27-104. Injunctions and orders,
(1) Any receiver appointed in a proceeding under this chapter may, at any
time, apply for and any court of general jurisdiction in this state may grant,
under the relevant provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any
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purposes of Subsection (2) if the lien or purchase superiority can be
obtained only through acts subsequent to the obtaining of the lien or
subsequent to the purchase which require the agreement or concurrence of
any third party or which require any further judicial action or ruling.
(4) Any transaction of the insurer with a reinsurer is considered fraudulent
and may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the transaction consists of the termination, adjustment, or settlement of a reinsurance contract in which the reinsurer is released from any
part of its duty to pay the originally specified share of losses that had
occurred prior to the time of the transaction, unless the reinsurer gives a
present fair consideration for the release; and
(b) any part of the transaction took place within one year prior to the
date of filing of the petition pursuant to which the rehabilitation or
liquidation was commenced.
(5) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after
the earlier of:
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section
31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339.
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-320, e n a c t e d by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 238.

Cross-References. — Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Title 25, Chapter 6.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of secured creditor to have
set aside fraudulent transfer of other property
by his debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123.

31A-27-321. Voidable preferences a n d liens,
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any of the
property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account
of an antecedent debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one year
before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation
under this chapter, the effect of which transfer may enable the creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor of the same
class would receive. If a liquidation order is entered while the insurer is
already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers otherwise qualifying
are considered to be preferences if they are made or allowed within one
year before the filing of the successful petition for rehabilitation or within
two years before the filing of the successful petition for liquidation,
whichever time is shorter.
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, if:
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer;
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing of
the petition;
(Hi) the creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it or his agent
acting with reference to the transfer had, at the time when the
transfer was made, reasonable cause to believe that the insurer was
or was about to become insolvent; or
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(iv) the creditor receiving it was an officer, an employee, an attorney, or other person who was in fact in a position of comparable
influence in the insurer to an officer, or any shareholder holding
directly or indirectly more than 5% of any class of equity security
issued by the insurer, or any other person with whom the insurer did
not deal at arm's length.
(c) Where the preference is voidable, the rehabilitator or liquidator may
recover the property or, if it has been converted, its value, from any person
who has received or converted the property, except that he may not recover
from a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's transferee for a
present fair consideration. Where a bona fide purchaser or lienor has given
less than fair consideration, the bona fide purchaser or lienor has a lien
upon the property to the extent of the consideration actually given by him.
Where a preference by way of lien or security title is voidable, the court
may, on due notice, order the lien or title to be preserved for the benefit of
the estate, in which event the lien or title passes to the liquidator.
(d) Any payment to which Subsection 31A-5-415(2) applies is a preference and is voidable under Subsection (l)(b) if it is made within the time
period specified in Subsection (l)(a), except that payments made by
insurers for the purchase of insurance under Section 16-10a-302 are not
preferences.
(2) Subsection 31A-27-320(2) applies to the perfection of transfers.
(3) Subsection 31A-27-320(3) applies to liens by legal or equitable proceedings.
(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for
or because of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a debt
incurred in the ordinary course of the business of the insurer and
according to normal business terms;
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable the insurer to
acquire the property and which is perfected within ten days after the
security interest attaches;
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent that after
the transfer, the creditor gave new value not secured by an unavoidable
security interest and on account of which the insurer did not make an
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of the creditor; or
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable
or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all of
those types of transfers to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount
by which the debt secured by the security interest exceeded the value of
the security interest four months prior to the date of liquidation or any
time subsequent to the liquidation.
(5) The receiver may avoid a transfer of property of the insurer transferred
to secure reimbursement of a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation
to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the receiver under
Subsection (l)(b). The liability of the surety under the bond or obligation shall
be discharged to the extent of the value of the property recovered by the
receiver or the amounts paid to the receiver.
(6) The property affected by any lien which is considered voidable under
Subsection (l)(b) and Subsection (5) is discharged from the lien, and that
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property and any of the indemnifying property transferred to or for the benefit
of a surety passes to the rehabihtator or liquidator, except that the court may,
on due notice, order the lien to be preserved for the benefit of the estate and the
court may direct that a conveyance be executed which is adequate to evidence
the title of the rehabihtator or liquidator.
(7) The court has jurisdiction of any proceeding by the rehabihtator or
liquidator, to hear and determine the rights of any parties under this section.
Reasonable notice of any hearing in the proceeding shall be given to all parties
in interest, including the obligee of a releasing bond or other similar obligation.
Where an order is entered for the recovery of indemnifying property in kind or
for the avoidance of an indemnifying lien, the court, upon application of any
party in interest, shall in the same proceeding ascertain the value of the
property or lien, and if the value is less than the amount for which the property
is indemnity or than the amount of the lien, the transferee or lienholder may
elect to retain the property or lien upon payment of its value, as ascertained by
the court, to the rehabihtator or liquidator within those reasonable times as
fixed by the court.
(8) The liability of a surety under a releasing bond or other similar
obligation is discharged to the extent of the value of the indemnifying property
recovered or the indemnifying lien nullified and avoided or, where the property
is retained under Subsection (7) to the extent of the amount paid to the
rehabihtator or liquidator.
(9) If a creditor has been preferred and afterward in good faith gives the
insurer further credit without security of any kind, for property which becomes
a part of the insurer's estate, the amount of the new credit remaining unpaid
at the time of the petition shall be setoff against the preference which would
otherwise be recoverable from him.
(10) If an insurer, directly or indirectly, within four months before the filing
of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation under this chapter or at
any time in contemplation of a proceeding to rehabilitate or liquidate it, pays
money or transfers property to an attorney at law for services rendered or to be
rendered, the transaction may be examined b}' the court on its own motion or
shall be examined by the court on petition of the rehabihtator or liquidator and
shall be held valid only to the extent the transfer is a reasonable amount as
determined by the court. The excess may be recovered by the rehabihtator or
liquidator for the benefit of the estate. If the attorney meets the description in
Subsection (l)(b)(iv), that subsection applies in place of this subsection.
(11) (a) Every officer, manager, employee, shareholder, member, subscriber,
attorney, or any other person acting on behalf of the insurer who
knowingly participates in giving any preference wThen he has reasonable
cause to believe the insurer is or is about to become insolvent at the time
of the preference, is personally liable to the rehabihtator or liquidator for
the amount of the preference. It is permissible to infer that there is
reasonable cause to so believe if the transfer was made within four months
before the date of filing the successful petition for rehabilitation or
liquidation.
(b) Every person receiving any property from the insurer or for the
benefit of the insurer as a preference which is voidable under Subsection
(1Kb) is personally liable for that transfer and property and is bound to
account to the rehabihtator or liquidator.
(c) This subsection does not prejudice any other claim by the rehabihtator or liquidator against any person.
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History: C. 1953, 31A-27-321, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 239;
1987, ch. 166, § 9; 1992, ch. 277, § 240.

31A-27-322. Recoupment from affiliates.
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an
insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter,
the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of the
insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made
at any time during the five years preceding the petition for liquidation,
rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the limitations of
Subsections (2) through (6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and
could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely affect
its solvency.
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the amount
needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the
receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has
already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states.
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time
the distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of distributions he
received. Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the
time the distributions were declared is liable up to the amount of distributions
he would have received if they had been paid immediately. If two or more
persons are liable regarding the same distributions, they are jointly and
severally liable.
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that
controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly
and severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from
the insolvent affiliate.
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director under
existing law.
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after
the earlier of:
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section
31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339.
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-322, enacted by
L. 1986, ch. 204, § 240.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1986, ch 204, § 240 repealed former § 31A-27-

31A-27-323.

322, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch 242, § 32,
relating to recovery from affiliates of excessive
contributions, and enacted present § 31A-27322, effective July 1, 1986.

Setoffs.

(1) Mutual debts or mutual credits between the insurer and another person
in connection with any action or proceeding under this chapter shall be set off
and only the balance shall be allowed or paid, except as provided in Subsection
(2).
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creation and maintenance of the deposits. If there is a deficiency in any deposit
so that the claims secured by it are not fully discharged from it, the claimants
may claim against a guaranty fund or association or may share in the general
assets, but the claim shall be limited and the sharing shall be deferred until
the general creditors having the same priority, and also the claimants against
other special deposits sharing the same priority who have received smaller
percentages from their respective special deposits, have been paid percentages
of their claims equal to the percentage paid from the special deposit.
(3) The owner of a secured claim against an insurer for which a liquidator
has been appointed in this state or any other state may surrender the security
for the claim and file the claim as a general creditor, or the claim may be
discharged by resort to the security in accordance with Section 31A-27-334, in
which case the deficiency, if any, shall be treated as a claim against the general
assets of the insurer on the same basis as claims of unsecured creditors.
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-409, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 249.

31A-27-410. Subordination of claims for noncooperation.
If an ancillary receiver in another state or foreign country, whether called an
ancillary receiver or not, fails to transfer to the domiciliary liquidator in Utah
any assets within his control other than special deposits, diminished only by
the expenses of the ancillary receivership, if any, then the claims filed in the
ancillary receivership, or with the guaranty fund or association in that
jurisdiction, other than special deposit claims or secured claims, shall be
placed in the class six of claims under Section 31A-27-335.
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-410, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1995, ch. 344, § 38.

31A-27-41L

Severability clause.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, or in conflict with or superseded by the
federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. Section 101 et seq., as
amended, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the provision to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by it.
History: € . 1953, 31A-27-411, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 250.
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178. Commencement of case
Bankruptcy section limiting avoidance
powers with respect to settlement payments made before commencement of
case did not apply to trustee's action to
recover transferred c e r t i f i e s of deposits or their proceeds, where transfer had

§ 547.
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occurred after SEC filed action against
brokerage pursuant to which receiver
was appointed, date which court had
held to be date of commencement of
case
M a t t e r o f B e v i ]I, Bresler & Schul,
m ^
D . N J . 1 9 8 8 f 8 3 B .R. 880.

Preferences

(a) In this section—
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished,
held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for
service, raw materials, vvork in process, or materials used or
consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops
or livestock, held for sale or lease;
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods,
services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property
previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is
neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any
applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does
not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation;
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not such
right has been earned by performance; and
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is
last payable without penalty, including any extension.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the
trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made—
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such
transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such
creditor would receive if—
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.
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(e) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer—
(1) to the extent that such transfer was—
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for
whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was—
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor—
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value
that was—
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as
collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under
such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor
receives possession of such property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after
such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit
of the debtor—
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security
interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not
make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the
benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that
the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest
138
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exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the
later of—
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under
the security agreement creating such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory hen that is not avoidable
under section 545 of this title; or
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are
primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property
that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.
(d) The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of
the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure
reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other
obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable
by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of
such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to
the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or
the amount paid to the trustee.
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section—
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the
sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser
of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
transferee. N
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made—
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or
within 10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of—
11 USC A §§544 to 700—6
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(i) the commencement of the case; or
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to
have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
(g) For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of
proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this
section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery
or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section.
(Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2597; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 310,
462, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 355, 377; Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, § 283(m), Oct.
27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3117.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1978 Acts. This section is a substantial
modification of present law. It modernizes the preference provisions and brings
them more into conformity with commercial practice and the Uniform Commercial Code.
Subsection (a) contains three definitions. Inventory, new value, and receivable are defined in their ordinary senses,
but are defined to avoid any confusion
or uncertainty surrounding the terms.
Subsection (b) is the operative provision of the section. It authorizes the
trustee to avoid a transfer if five conditions are met. These are the five elements of a preference action. First, the
transfer must be to or for the benefit of
a creditor. Second, the transfer must be
for or on account of an antecedent debt
owed by the debtor before the transfer
was made. Third, the transfer must
have been made when the debtor was
insolvent. Fourth, the transfer must
have been made during the 90 days immediately preceding the commencement
of the case. If the transfer was to an
insider, the trustee may avoid the transfer if it was made during the period that
begins one year before the filing of the
petition and ends 90 days before the
filing, if the insider to whom the transfer
was made had reasonable cause to be-

lieve the debtor was insolvent at the time
the transfer was made.
Finally, the transfer must enable the
creditor to whom or for whose benefit it
was made to receive a greater percentage of his claim than he would receive
under the distributive provisions of the
bankruptcy code. Specifically, the creditor must receive more than he would if
the case were a liquidation case, if the
transfer had not been made, and if the
creditor received payment of the debt to
the extent provided by the provisions of
the code.
The phrasing of the final element
changes the application of the greater
percentage test from that employed under current law. Under this language,
the court must focus on the relative distribution between classes as well as the
amount that will be received by the
members of the class of which the creditor is a member. The language also
requires the court to focus on the allowability of the claim for which the preference was made. If the claim would have
been entirely disallowed, for example,
then the test of paragraph (5) will be
met, because the creditor would have
received nothing under the distributive
provisions of the bankruptcy code.
The trustee may avoid a transfer of a
lien under this section even if the lien
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Sherry W. Gilbert, Esq.
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 7500
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re:

CSX Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Sherry:
We have reviewed the allocations which you provided us
in December. The two most recent allocations indicate that our
prior estimates for Southern's potential liability were
underestimated. This has caused us to reconsider our settlement
position. However, in the interests of resolving this dispute
quickly and economically, we are making a settlement offer based
on the following considerations.
The part of the settlement agreement which causes us
the most concern is CSX's contribution to the asbestos Tosses.
Based~on_our current projections, CSX will pay approximately $30
million in asbestos losses. However, the self-insured" retentions
under all the policies issued to CSX and its predecessor entities
total well over $60 million. Thus, $30 million, in asbestos
losses, will be allocated to the insurers which should be
allocated to CSX.
~~
Another problem with the settlement agreement is the
very high settlement: autmority given to CSX. BasecTon the
statistics that we have seen so far, the average"~litigated claim
has settled for $58,000. However, the settlemenf~agreement
provides tor a $lbU,OUU/ciaim settlement authority. In effect,
this means tnat no settlement will t>e reviewed py the Claims
Handling AgentT Our concern over this provision in the
settlement agreement is heightened by the fact that _a
disproportionately large amount of the claims have been settled
over the last two years. During these same two years, CSX's
contribution to the asbestos losses has been limited to 10% of
the total losses. Our concern is not limited to the settlement
amounts over the last two years but also includes the fear that
settlements will again be disproportionately greater in the last

0 00 2

Sherry W. Gilbert, Esquire
March 1, 1991
Page 2
few years of the settlement agreement. The very high settlement
authority increases the chance that insurers will have to pay for
claims which would not otherwise have come under the settlement
agreement.
Our current estimate for total asbestos losses is $130 L C C /
million. Of that amount we expect $100 million to be allocated
to the insurers. Based on prior allocations, we* expect
Southern's portion of this amount to be .16% or, $160,000.
Although the settlement agreement provides for the payment of
this amount over time, given that this is a relatively small
amount and that it would be costly to Southern to pay its
obligations in small amounts every year, we propose that Southern
pay a lump sum which is discounted to reflect the time value of
money.' We," therefore, propose to settle the claims arrslnq out
of the asbestos action for $100,000. This amount aiso"~Tncludes a
reduction to account for the disproportionate allocation to the
insurers of the asbestos losses.
" '
*
If you would like to discuss this proposal, I am
available to meet at your convenience.

ylOT ffHnnt2> /^

REH/pdh

Robert E.'^ggestad

*°**«*<
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CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT
CQHHUNICATION
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C.
The Southern Building
805 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Re:

CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Bob:
CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") has considered Southern
American's settlement proposal set forth in your March 1, 1991
letter to me and has the following response.
Southern American's concerns with CSXTfs coverage-in-place
settlement arrangement are unfounded. As I am certain you can
appreciate, CSXT and the settling insurers differed on a number
of issues and the settlement represents an overall compromise.
Thus, focusing on specific issues in isolation can create an
inaccurate perspective. However, Southern American's concerns
warrant comment, even when viewed out of the context of the
complete agreement.
First, CSXT views its contribution to asbestos losses as
more than adequate. Of the more than $98 million paid in
asbestos losses to date, CSXT's contribution (excluding the
amounts allocable under the agreement to non-settling insurers)
has been approximately $22 million. This amount is comprised
of the initial $10 million in losses absorbed by CSXT under the
agreement, CSXTfs 10% to 20% share of the losses, and CSXT's
Under certain constructions of the policy language, CSXTfs
contribution would have been limited to a mere fraction of that
amount.

Oft 0 2.13
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Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
May 20, 1991
Page 2

responsibility for the amounts that otherwise would be allocated
to insolvent insurers. Currently, the insolvent insurers' shares
represent approximately 4% of the first-layer coverage.
Second, the settlement authority has not presented a problem
for the settling insurers. CSXT has consulted with the Claims
Handling Agent concerning settlement on numerous occasions and
CSXT is confident that the settling insurers would confirm that
CSXT has not abused its settlement authority.
Thus, CSXT's offer to Southern American to sign onto the
existing coverage-in-place settlement stands. If Southern
American should decide to do so, its allocations through the
Seventh Billing (through 9/30/90) total approximately §109,000.
A copy of the Seventh Billing is enclosed for your information.
If Southern American prefers a lump-sum settlement, CSXT is
willing to entertain that approach. However, any such settlement
must be based upon a more realistic amount than the $100,000 that
Southern American has offered. According to CSXT's estimates for
total asbestos losses, Southern American's share under the
existing agreement's allocation method would approximate
§387,500.00. CSXT does not share Southern American's view that a
discount is appropriate, particularly since no interest has been
computed on the amounts due from Southern American for asbestos
losses dating back to the early 1980's.
If you or your client would like to discuss either of these
proposals further, please let me know.

lerry/w. Gilbert
SWG:ks
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Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
May 20, 1991
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bcc:

R. Templeton Fitch
C- Keith Meiser

0 0025 5

CBX MBSSTOS SETTLEMENT

gg«KARY,Qr MPPlfM
DPg TROK IKgraEKg

4/l/?9 TO t/3?/?9

Aetna
All Star
American Roma
American Reinsurance
Bellefonte
California Union
Casualty Insurance
Continental Casualty
Employers Surplus
Federal Ins.
First State
General Reinsurance
Glacier Ins.
Harbor
Home
SW-El PaiO
HSW-Kingscroft
HSW-Louisville
HSW-Hutual Re
HSM-Othar
Imperio
International Re
Interstate
ISLIC
Lexington
Lloyd's & Cos.
(Mentor
Midland
Mutual Fire
North River
Nationwide
Pacific (Harbor)
Seguros
Signal
Southern American
St. Helens
TMI
Wausau
Unknown

$1,258,246.71
14,843.02
98,243.48
466,097.01
27,809.70
1,234,025.61
1,854.74
81,518.77
409,698.18
32,544.98
123,986.69
279,360.29
40,847.53
7,584,023.31
87,946.79
C"66,963.43,
123,462.32*,
". 53,009.89.62,342.83.;
323,153.97
4,389.09
23,261.03
13,367.16
406,981.23
321,107.65
C*,Z56l_529i£9„
12,4 2 4~. 19
3,709.48
40,537.22
245,422.71
121,353.86
127,589.91
6,027.91
2,013.93
29,179.63
42,176.96
' 417,892.44
591,324.83
507,560.90
$20,042,828.47

IHSUR&R: SOUTHS* K.JRICAH
p a g e No.
02/19/91

Kendo. »*d * 0 1 ^*
r
RelBburstbl. by Insurer
CSX Railroad
Yaar Rei»bur»abl«

policy

79
** Policy: XC860028
** subtotal **

9595.46
80

** policy: XG860092
«* subtotal **

*** Total ***

07/15/80-07/31/81
10014.93

81
** Policy: XG860108
** Subtotal **

07/15/79-07/14/80

08/01/81-07/31/82
9569.24
29179.63
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June 2 2 , 1991

Sherry W. G i l b e r t , Esq.
Anderson, K i l l , Olick & Oshinsky
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
S u i t e 7500
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re:

CSX Asbestos Coveraga Liticration

Dear Sherry:
Southern American has authorized me to respor-"
letter at May 20, 1991 regarding its previous proposal
lump-sum settlement of $100,000, Your counter-offer, *
not reflect a present value discount, appears to be ba=^
estimate of the insurer's share of future asbestos losses
approximately $191,408,000, -p
It is our belief that the insurer's share of asbestos
losses under~"the existing allocation formula wlll~hot exceed
$lOQ/tfg5iO 00 during the remainder of the term of the "agreement.
ThU3T"~wgr~&elleye that Southern American's projecjSed share,
including^the_$109,000 allocated to date, should be approximately
$254f500r"not $387,500. Regardless of whether or not CSX has
computed interest on back amounts, there is unquestionably a
certain present value premium which attaches to any large lump
sum payment received in advance of the remaining 9 years during
which this sum would be paid out under the settlement agreement•
Under these circumstances, Southern American is willing to offer
CSX $2l0,Q00as a lump sum settlement to dispose of this matter.
Please call me if you would like to discuss this matter
in greater detail.

E« Heggestad
REH/ddd
cc:

Mr, Max Levine
Southern £-.erican Insurance Company

0002 % 5
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
Caseyr Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C.
The Southern Building
805 15th Street, N.W,
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Re:

CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Bob:
CSXT has reviewed Southern American's recent settlement
proposal as set forth in your June 22, 1991 letter to me.
Initially, CSXT does not understand the basis for Southern
Americanfs projection that its total share of asbestos losses
during the term of the existing agreement with other insurers
would amount to $254,500. If you can provide further support for
this projection, perhaps it would be useful to CSXT's analysis.
However, CSXT remains willing to accept a lump-sum
settlement based upon its own projections of Southern American's
share under the settlement agreement. As you are aware, the
allocations to Southern American under the settlement agreement,
through September 1990 (Bill No, 7), total $108,736.41/ and CSXT
estimates that Southern American's future allocations would total
$278,700 during the remainder of the term of the agreement. If
those amounts are adjusted to account for interest accrued (from
the date of billing) on past allocations and to account for the
present value of future allocations, the total lump-sum payment
acceptable to CSXT is $336,000.
I look forward to your response.
Sincerely,

herry w. Gilbert
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August 8f 1991

Sherry W. Gilbert, Esq*
Anderson, Kill/, olick & Oshinsky
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 7500
Washington, D,C. 20006
R»:

CSX Asbestos Covtragi Litigation

Dear Sherry I
In our last conversation regarding settlement of this
matter , y o t ^ r o \ ^ ^
the basis for
CSX's rSroTection . ^
Although this
information was quite helpful, unfortunately it does not allow
Southern to predict with any great amount of certainty what the
total claims will amount to during the next ten years. To
resolve this issue, I am authorized to propose a compromise offar
of one lump sum payment of $308,000. Please call me if you would
like to discuss this matter further.
Sincerely,.

Robert E« Ifeggestad
REH/pdh
cc:.

Max Levine

0 0026 0
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August 16; 1991

Oharry W. Gilbert/ Esq.
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 7500
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re:

CSX Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Sherry:
In my August 8, 1991 letter to you, I proposed a lump
cum paymont of $3 08,000 to oettlc thie matter on behalf of
Southern* Amerioan Insurance Company, This prapoaal is baaed e*
payment schedule which would provide for the first 1/3 pay**-due on October 31, 1991, &ro tho romaining 1/3 paymcnta due o<November 31, 1991 and December 31, 1991, Please call me if you
would like to discuss either the amount or the payment schedule
UlU^i1* 0^UtlV^« L^o wa.www0t=d.

Sincerely,

Roberta. Heggestad
SEH/pdh
cc:

Max Levine

ft 0 0 1 $\
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C.
The Southern Building
805 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Re:

CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Bob:
CSXT has asked me to convey to you that it is willing to
accept Southern American's offer of $308,000 to settle CSXT's
asbestos coverage litigation. CSXT understands that Southern
American will make the payment in three installations due on
^October 31, November 30, and December 31, 1991, respectively.
(I would suggest the first two payments be in the amount of
$102,667 each and the last in the amount of $102,666.)
Please provide me, for CSXT's review, with Southern
American's proposed settlement documents as soon as possible.
Sincerely,

Gilbert
SWG:ks

000
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{202J 662-MOS2

E.HEGGESTAD

November 6, 1991
VIA FACSIMILE
Sherry w. Gilbert, Esq,
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky
2 000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 7500
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re:

C8X Asbestos Coverage Litigation

Dear Sherry:
Enclosed is the signed settlement letter recently
forwarded to me from Southern American.
With best regards,
Sincerely,

Robert fy. Heggestad
REH/pdh
Enclosure

000263
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PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL
8ETTLEHENT COMMUNICATION
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C.
The Southern Building
805 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
Re:

Southern American/CSXT Asbestos Coverage Settlement

Dear Bob:
*This will confirm the arrangements agreed to in connection
with the asbestos-related settlement between Southern American
Insurance Company ("Southern") and CSX Transportation, Inc.
("CSXT")* The arrangements that have been agreed to are:
Settlement Terms, Southern sold third-party liability
insurance policies to one or more of CSXT's predecessor
railroads. Subject to the modifications noted below, Southern
agrees to join and participate in the Settlement Agreement
executed by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and London
Market Insurance Companies on September 16, 1988; by CSXT and its
parent corporation CSX Corporation (collectively "CSX"), on
September 19, 1988; and by Harbor Insurance Company on September
20, 1988 (the "Settlement Agreement"), which is incorporated
herein by reference.
a.

The DEFINITIONS Section of the Settlement
Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows.
"Coverage Suits" means the actions titled The
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, et al. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and London Market
Insurance Companies, et al. and Western Maryland
Railway Company v. Harbor Insurance Company, et al,,
Civil Action No. 85-3162 (D.D.C) and No. 85-3163
(D.D.C.), filed in the United States District Court for
the'District of Columbia on October^, 1985, and CSX

RECEIVED OCT 2 8

raft
0 0 0 2 o -'

A N D E R S O N KILL OLICK & OSHINSKY

Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
October 14, 1991
Page 2

Transportation, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co,,
Civil Action No. 9G-00015-R, filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on
January 11, 1990.
b.

Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement has been modified
and a copy is attached hereto.

c.

"Section I. PAYMENT PROVISIONS" is deleted in its
entirety, and the following shall be substituted
therefor:
Section I.

PAYMENT PROVISIONS

In settlement of the Coverage Suits, the
parties agree to the following payment
provisions:
1.

Southern will pay CSX the sum of
$308,000.00 as follows:
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991
$102,667.00 on November 30, 1991
$102,666.00 on December 31, 1991

This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any
claim by CSX against the policies issued by
Southern for any losses due to AsbestosRelated Claims, past, present, or future,
vhether or not asserted in the Coverage
Suits.
2.

d

*

Southern shall not be liable to pay
CSX for losses due to AsbestosRelated Claims other than as set
forth in this Agreement.

Effective Date. From and after the countersigning of
this letter, the Settlement Agreement, as modified
herein, shall be in full force and effect as between
CSX and Southern and their respective obligations and
undertakings shall be the same as if Southern had been
an original settling "Insurer" as defined in the
Settlement Agreement*

0 0026 5
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Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire
October 14, 1991
Page 3

e.

Notice. Any notice or correspondence to Southern
regarding the Settlement Agreement shall be in writing
addressed to:
Mr. Max Levine
Vice President/Claims
1450 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84 606

Please have the enclosed copy of this letter executed on
behalf of Southern and return it to me at your earliest
convenience.
Very truly yours,

Sherry w. Gilbert

ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADOPTED BY
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADOPTED BY
SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY

By: n^U^U/

Bv: X^^p^Ss^,

I t s : V V Tjys,,//^ S,C-r^JCrl.f:Vl

mfAfJits:

JK&

y

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

V

Dated;

/D~/7~^f

Dated:

/J~>

J^T

/
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CHESSIE SYSTEM. INC.. ET AL
(PER NAMED INSURED ENDORSEMENT)
2 NORTH CHARLES STREET
BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21201
INFORMATION

EXCESS LIABILITY

INGS

ANO/OR

T ACHED

AS PER FORM

II

ENDORSEMENTS

HERETO.

SAID

A*

WOROING

A N D / O R ENDORSEMENTS PREVAIL.

COMMENCING

ENDING

JULY \k,

MtUK.
A**ce

MERE ABBREVIATED.

EVENT OF INCONSISTENCY W I T H WORt

STANDARD TIME AT THE

1979

JULY \k,

•ggggggpffgggyggggg^f

1980

ABOVE ADDRESS OF THE INSURED

PJgffiJT
$950,000.00

$950,000.00
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PRODUCER'S COPY
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o
c

0 0 0331

HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
SECTION 1. DECLARATIONS
1.1 NAMED INSURED AND ADDRESS:

(PER^MED^WED^NDORSEMEHT)

2 NORTH CHARLES STREET, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
1.2 POLICY PERIOD: FROM JULY 1*4, 1979
TO JULY \k9 1980
(NOON fc*3C»5tX*XM- STANDARD TIME AT THE ABOVE ADURLSS
O F T H E NAMED INSURED)
1.3 PREMIUM:
RATE:
$ . 5 5 5 2 2 PER $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 REVENUE
DEPOSIT: $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
MINIMUM:
$
956,129.00
1.4

RETAINED LIMIT -

PERSONAL INJURY AND
P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE:

e r r cunnR^FMP^T M.i 1
END0R
SEMENT NO.2

5EE

1. 5 OCCURRENCE LIMIT - PERSONAL INJURY AND
P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE:

*Q 0 0 0 O 0 « o n
ju.u^.ww.uu

1.6 AGGREGATE LIMIT -

$$000

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE:

000.00

1.7 THE INSURED R E P R E S E N T S THAT IT HAS NOT PURCHASED OR HAD
PURCHASED FOR ITS ACCOUNT INSURANCE AFFORDING P R O T E C TION AGAINST LIABILITY TO THE EXTENT OF "ULTIMATE NET LOSS"
WITHIN THE RETAINED LIMIT AS EXPRESSED IN SECTION 1.4, E X C E P T FOR:
.
SEE ENDORSEMENT HO. 3

AND COVERAGE O F RAILROAD P R O T E C T I V E , SPECIAL TOURS AND
SIMILAR TYPES O F COVERAGE AS W E L L AS OTHER S P E C I F I C INSURANCES NOT INVOLVING DIRECT RAILROAD OPERATING EXPOSURES
AND AGREES TO GIVE THE HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY 10 DAYS
ADVANCE WRITTEN NOTICE O F ITS INTENTION TO PURCHASE OR TO
HAVE PURCHASED F O R ITS ACCOUNT ANY OTHER SUCH INSURANCE.
A T T A C H E D TO AND FORMING A PART O F POLICY NO. 137030
ISSUED T O :

CHESS IE SYSTEM, I N C . , ET AL

DATED:

AUGUST \k,

1979
HARBOR INSURANCE COM PAN Y
BY
(AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE)

(PROVISIONS ON PAGES 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 AND 10 ARE
H E R E B Y R E F E R R E D TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF)

HU 8179 (1 OF 10) (ED. 8/78)

6 003 3 2
-1-

EXCESS INDEMNITY RAILROAD OPERATIONS POLICY
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY. HEREIN CALLED THE COMPANY)
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM, IN RELIANCE
UPON THE STATEMENTS IN SECTION 1. MADE A PART HEREOF AND SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY. AGREES WITH THE INSURED NAMED IN SECTION 1.1 AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 2. INSURING AGREEMENTS
2. 1 COVERAGE. THE COMPANY WILL INDEMNIFY THE INSURED FOR ALL
SUMS WHICH THE INSURED SHALL BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO
PAY AS DAMAGES (ALL AS HEREINAFTER DEFINED AS INCLUDED
WITHIN THE TERM "ULTIMATE NET LOSS') BECAUSE OF PERSONAL
INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE. CAUSED BY AN OCCURRENCE AND
ARISING OUT OF OPERATIONS NECESSARY TO THE CONDUCT OF THE
BUSINESS OF THE NAMED INSURED.
2. 2

RETAINED LIMIT - OTHER INSURANCE. THE COMPANY SHALL BE LIABLE ONLY FOR THAT AMOUNT OF ULTIMATE NET LOSS RESULTING
FROM ANY ONE OCCURRENCE WHICH IS IN EXCESS OF:
(A) THE AMOUNT STATED IN SECTION 1.4 AS "RETAINED LIMIT". OR
(B) THE AMOUNT OF THE APPLICABLE LIMIT OR LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF OTHER INSURANCE CARRIED BY THE INSURED OR ON ITS
BEHALF, IF THE AMOUNT OF SUCH LIMIT OR LIMITS, OR THE
AGGREGATE THEREOF, IS GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT STATED
IN SECTION 1.4 AS THE "RETAINED LIMIT".

2.3

LIMITS OF LIABILITY. REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS
OR ORGANIZATIONS WHO MAY CLAIM INDEMNITY UNDER THIS POLICY
AS INSUREDS, THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR ULTIMATE NET LOSS
BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM ANY ONE OCCURRENCE SHALL THEN BE LIMITED TO THE
AMOUNT STATED IN SECTION 1.5 AS "OCCURRENCE LIMIT- PERSONAL
INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE"; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE
COMPANY'S LIABILITY SHALL BE FURTHER LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT
STATED IN SECTION 1. 6 WITH RESPECT TO ALL ULTIMATE NET LOSS
BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY WHICH OCCURS DURING EACH ANNUAL PERIOD WHILE THIS POLICY IS IN FORCE COMMENCING FROM
ITS EFFECTIVE DATE, AND WHICH ARISES OUT OF OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES OF EMPLOYEES OF THE INSURED.
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE LIMIT OF THE COMPANY'S
LIABILITY, A L L PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING

HU 8179 (2 OF 10)
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OUT O F CONTINUOUS OR R E P E A T E D EXPOSURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY
T H E SAME GENERAL CONDITION EXISTING AT OR EMANATING FROM
ONE LOCATION OR SOURCE SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS ARISING OUT
O F ONE OCCURRENCE.
2.4

E X P E N S E S . THE COMPANY WILL INDEMNIFY THE INSURED FOR E X P E N SES PAID OR INCURRED BY T H E INSURED IN CONNECTION WITH P E R SONAL INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE ARISING OUT O F AN OCCURR E N C E TO WHICH THIS POLICY A P P L I E S . SUCH EXPENSE IS PAYABLE
IN ADDITION TO ANY LIMIT O F THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR U L T I MATE N E T LOSS, BUT THE COMPANY SHALL NOT BE OBLIGATED TO
PAY ANY G R E A T E R PROPORTION O F SUCH EXPENSE THAN THE
AMOUNT O F ULTIMATE N E T LOSS PAYABLE UNDER THIS POLICY
BEARS TO THE T O T A L O F A L L ULTIMATE NET LOSS RESULTING FROM
SUCH OCCURRENCE.

2. 5

P O L I C Y PERIOD: T E R R I T O R Y . THIS POLICY A P P L I E S ONLY TO O C CURRENCES DURING THE POLICY PERIOD AS STATED IN SECTION 1. 2
AND
(1)

WITHIN THE UNITED STATES O F AMERICA, ITS TERRITORIES OR
POSSESSIONS, OR CANADA, OR

(2)

E L S E W H E R E THAN WITHIN THE TERRITORY DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (1) ABOVE, PROVIDED T H E ORIGINAL SUIT FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST THE INSURED IS BROUGHT WITHIN SUCH TERRITORY.

SECTION 3. SEVERABILITY O F INTERESTS: DEFINITION O F INSURED
3.1

THE INSURANCE A F F O R D E D BY THIS POLICY A P P L I E S S E P A R A T E L Y
TO EACH INSURED AGAINST WHOM CLAIM IS MADE OR SUIT IS
BROUGHT, E X C E P T WITH R E S P E C T TO THE LIMITS O F THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY, AND THE INCLUSION HEREIN OF MORE THAN ONE INSURED SHALL NOT O P E R A T E T O INCREASE THE LIMITS O F THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY.

3.2

"INSURED" MEANS THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN S E C TION 1.1 AND ANY EXECUTIVE O F F I C E R , DIRECTOR OR STOCKHOLDE R T H E R E O F WHILE ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE O F HIS DUTIES AS
SUCH.
"INSURED" SHALL ALSO INCLUDE:
(1)

ANY SUBSIDIARY O F T H E PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN
SECTION 1.1 ACQUIRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE E F F E C T I V E DATE
O F THIS POLICY AND COMING UNDER THE CONTROL AND A C T I V E MANAGEMENT O F T H E PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN
SECTION 1 . 1 , PROVIDED WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE ACQUISITION
O F SUCH SUBSIDIARY IS GIVEN T O THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS
T H E R E A F T E R , OR

HU 8179 (3 O F 10)
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(2)

ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION COMING UNDER THE CONTROL AND
ACTIVE MANAGEMENT O F THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION
NAMED IN SECTION 1.1 SUBSEQUENT TO THE E F F E C T I V E DATE
O F THIS POLICY, PROVIDED WRITTEN NOTICE OF SUCH CONT R O L AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SUCH ORGANIZATION IS GIVEN TO THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS T H E R E A F T E R .

SUCH WRITTEN NOTICE SHALL ALSO STATE THE DATE ON WHICH THE
INSURANCE FOR SUCH SUBSIDIARY OR OTHER ORGANIZATION IS TO
COMMENCE WHICH DATE SHALL NOT BE PRIOR TO THE DATE SUCH
SUBSIDIARY OR OTHER ORGANIZATION COMES UNDER T H E CONTROL
AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT O F THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION
NAMED IN SECTION 1 . 1 .
SECTION 4.

OTHER DEFINITIONS

4. 1

" A I R C R A F T " MEANS ANY HEAVIER THAN AIR OR LIGHTER THAN AIR
A I R C R A F T DESIGNED TO TRANSPORT PERSONS OR P R O P E R T Y .

4. 2

"AUTOMOBILE" MEANS A LAND MOTOR VEHICLE, TRAILER OR S E M I T R A I L E R , BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY VEHICLES WHILE O P E R A T E D
ON RAILS.

4. 3

" O C C U R R E N C E " MEANS AN ACCIDENT, INCLUDING CONTINUOUS OR
R E P E A T E D EXPOSURE TO CONDITIONS, WHICH RESULTS IN P E R S O N A L
INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE NEITHER E X P E C T E D NOR INTENDED
FROM THE STANDPOINT O F T H E INSURED.

4.4

" P E R S O N A L INJURY" MEANS BODILY INJURY, MENTAL ANGUISH,
SHOCK. SICKNESS OR DISEASE. INCLUDING DEATH RESULTING T H E R E F R O M ; AND INJURY ARISING OUT O F FALSE ARREST, DETENTION OR
IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, WRONGFUL ENTRY OR
EVICTION. RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION ( E X C E P T WHERE
INSURANCE FOR SUCH OCCURRENCE IS PROHIBITED BY LAW OR R E G U LATION), L I B E L . SLANDER, DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER OR INVASION O F PRIVACY.

4. 5

" P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE" MEANS INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION O F T A N GIBLE P R O P E R T Y (OTHER THAN P R O P E R T Y OWNED BY THE NAMED
INSURED) AND A L L DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS RESULTING
THEREFROM

4. 6

" U L T I M A T E N E T LOSS" MEANS THE TOTAL O F A L L DAMAGES, AS D E F I N E D BELOW, WITH R E S P E C T TO EACH OCCURRENCE:
'DAMAGES" MEANS A L L SUMS WHICH THE INSURED, OR ANY COMPANY AS ITS INSURER, OR BOTH, BECOME LEGALLY O B L I G A T E D
TO PAY AS DAMAGES. WHETHER BY REASON OF ADJUDICATION OR

HU 8179 (4 O F 10)
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S E T T L E M E N T , BECAUSE O F PERSONAL INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y
DAMAGE TO WHICH THIS POLICY A P P L I E S . IN DETERMINING THE
RETAINED LIMIT IN SECTION 2. 2 FOREGOING, 'DAMAGES" SHALL
B E AS DEFINED HEREIN, LESS AMOUNTS REALIZED FROM THIRDPARTY RECOVERIES AND THE NET VALUE OF SALVAGE;
PROVIDED "ULTIMATE N E T LOSS" SHALL NOT INCLUDE EXPENSES
AND SHALL NOT INCLUDE ANY DAMAGES BECAUSE O F LIABILITY E X C L U D E D BY THIS POLICY.
4. 7 " E X P E N S E S " MEANS INTEREST ACCRUING A F T E R ENTRY O F JUDGMENT
AND A L L REASONABLE EXPENSES (INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S F E E S AND
COURT COSTS) INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN THE INVESTIGATION,
S E T T L E M E N T AND DEFENSE O F ANY CLAIM OR SUIT SEEKING SUCH
DAMAGES AS DEFINED UNDER 'ULTIMATE N E T LOSS" AS A CONSEQ U E N C E O F ANY OCCURRENCE HEREUNDER (EXCLUDING, HOWEVER,
A L L O F F I C E EXPENSES OF T H E INSURED, A L L SALARIES, WAGES AND
E X P E N S E S FOR E M P L O Y E E S O F T H E INSURED AND G E N E R A L RETAINE R F E E S FOR ATTORNEYS NORMALLY PAID BY THE INSURED).
SECTION 5. EXCLUSIONS
THIS POLICY DOES NOT A P P L Y :
5.1

T O PERSONAL INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE FOR WHICH THE INSURED HAS ASSUMED LIABILITY UNDER ANY CONTRACT OR A G R E E M E N T , I F SUCH PERSONAL INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE O C C U R R E D OR COMMENCED PRIOR TO THE TIME SUCH CONTRACT OR
A G R E E M E N T BECAME EFFECTTVE;

5. 2

T O ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE INSURED OR ANY CARRIER AS
ITS INSURER MAY B E HELD LIABLE:

5.3

(1)

UNDER ANY WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, OR ANY SIMILAR
LAW, I F AT THE TIME O F THE OCCURRENCE GIVING RISE TO SUCH
OBLIGATION THE INSURED IS NOT A QUALIFIED SELF-INSURER
WITH R E S P E C T TO SUCH OBLIGATION, OR

(2)

UNDER ANY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY B E N E F I T S LAW. OR ANY SIMILAR LAW;

E X C E P T WITH R E S P E C T TO PERSONAL INJURY TO E M P L O Y E E S OF
T H E INSURED ARISING OUT O F OR IN THE COURSE O F E M P L O Y M E N T
BY T H E INSURED, TO LIABILITY ARISING OUT O F T H E OWNERSHIP,
MAINTENANCE, OPERATION, USE, LOADING OR UNLOADING O F :
(1)

ANY AUTOMOBILE OWNED OR O P E R A T E D BY OR R E N T E D OR
LOANED TO THE INSURED, OR ANY OTHER AUTOMOBILE O P E R A T E D BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE O F HIS E M P L O Y M E N T BY
THE INSURED;

HU 8179 (5 O F 10)
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(2)

ANY AIRCRAFT OWNED OR O P E R A T E D BY OR RENTED OR
LOANED TO THE INSURED. OR ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT O P E R A T E D
BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE O F HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED;

(3) ANY W A T E R C R A F T . BUT THIS EXCLUSION SHALL NOT A P P L Y IF
THE PERSONAL INJURY OR P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE ARISES OUT O F
T H E LOADING OR UNLOADING O F ANY WATERCRAFT AT PREMISES
OWNED BY, RENTED TO OR CONTROLLED BY THE INSURED P R O VIDED SUCH WATERCRAFT IS NOT OWNED OR O P E R A T E D BY OR IS
NOT RENTED OR LOANED TO T H E INSURED, OR IS NOT O P E R A T E D
BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE O F HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED.
5.4

TO P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE TO P R O P E R T Y IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR
CONTROL OF THE INSURED OR P R O P E R T Y AS TO WHICH THE INSURED
IS FOR ANY PURPOSE EXERCISING PHYSICAL CONTROL.
SECTION 6.

6. 1

CONDITIONS

PREMIUM. THE DEPOSIT PREMIUM IN SECTION 1. 3 IS AN ADVANCE
PREMIUM ONLY. EARNED PREMIUM SHALL B E COMPUTED AT THE
END O F EACH ANNUAL PERIOD FOR WHICH THE POLICY IS IN FORCE
A T THE RATES A P P L I C A B L E T H E R E T O , PROVIDED THAT SUCH
EARNED PREMIUM SHALL NOT B E LESS THAN THE MINIMUM P R E M I UM STATED IN SECTION 1 . 3 . A P P R O P R I A T E ADDITIONAL PREMIUM
SHALL BE PAYABLE WITH R E S P E C T TO ANY ADDITIONAL NAMED INSURED AND ANY SUBSIDIARY OR O T H E R ORGANIZATION WHO B E COMES AN INSURED UNDER T H E PROVISIONS O F SECTION 3 . 2 .
" R E V E N U E " AS USED IN SECTION 1.3 SHALL MEAN THE TOTAL O F
A L L FIGURES R E P O R T E D AS T O T A L RAILWAY OPERATING REVENUES
TO T H E INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION UNDER T H E UNIFORM
SYSTEM O F ACCOUNTS O F T H E I N T E R S T A T E COMMERCE COMMISSION.

6. 2

AUDIT. THE COMPANY SHALL B E P E R M I T T E D TO EXAMINE AND AUDIT THE INSURED'S BOOKS AND RECORDS A T ANY TIME WHILE THIS
POLICY IS IN F O R C E AND WITHIN T H R E E YEARS A F T E R T H E FINAL
TERMINATION O F THIS POLICY OR WITHIN ONE YEAR A F T E R FINAL
S E T T L E M E N T O F A L L CLAIMS ARISING OUT O F ANY OCCURRENCE
DURING THE POLICY T E R M .

6. 3

NOTICE OF OCCURRENCE. WHENEVER IT A P P E A R S THAT AN OCCURR E N C E MAY POSSIBLY INVOLVE CLAIMS IN THE AGGREGATE T O T A L ING MORE THAN 50% O F T H E RETAINED LIMIT, WRITTEN NOTICE
T H E R E O F SHALL B E GIVEN TO THE COMPANY OR ANY O F ITS AU-
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THORIZED AGENTS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. SUCH NOTICE SHALL
CONTAIN PARTICULARS SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY THE INSURED AND
ALSO REASONABLY OBTAINABLE INFORMATION RESPECTING THE
T I M E , P L A C E AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OCCURRENCE, THE
NAMES AND ADDRESSES O F THE INJURED AND O F AVAILABLE
WITNESSES.
6.4

ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION O F THE INSURED. THE INSURED
SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OR DEFENSE O F ANY
CLAIM MADE OR SUIT BROUGHT OR PROCEEDING INSTITUTED
AGAINST THE INSURED WHICH NO OTHER INSURER IS OBLIGATED TO
DEFEND
THE INSURED SHALL USE DUE DILIGENCE AND PRUDENCE
TO S E T T L E ALL SUCH CLAIMS AND SUITS WHICH IN THE EXERCISE OF
SOUND JUDGMENT SHOULD B E SETTLED, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT
T H E INSURED SHALL MAKE NO SETTLEMENT FOR ANY SUM IN EXCESS
O F T H E RETAINED LIMIT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL O F THE COMPANY.
WHEN IN THE JUDGMENT O F THE COMPANY AN OCCURRENCE MAY INVOLVE DAMAGES IN EXCESS O F THE RETAINED LIMIT OR THE LIMIT
O F OTHER INSURANCE, THE COMPANY MAY E L E C T AT ANY TIME TO
P A R T I C I P A T E WITH T H E INSURED AND ANY OTHER INSURER IN THE INVESTIGATION, S E T T L E M E N T , AND DEFENSE OF A L L CLAIMS AND
SUITS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. THE INSURED WILL, AT THE R E QUEST O F THE COMPANY, S U P P L Y COPIES O F ANY INVESTIGATIVE R E P O R T S , MEDICAL R E P O R T S , OPINIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE O F DEF E N S E COUNSEL AND ANY OTHER MATERIAL ACCUMULATED IN P R E P ARATION O F THE DEFENSE O F THE CLAIM OR SUIT
T H E INSURED SHALL C O O P E R A T E WITH THE OTHER INSURERS AS R E QUIRED BY THE TERMS OF T H E OTHER INSURANCE POLICIES AND COMP L Y WITH A L L THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS T H E R E O F , AND SHALL
E N F O R C E ANY RIGHT O F CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY AGAINST ANY
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY B E LIABLE TO THE INSURED B E CAUSE O F PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WITH R E S P E C T
T O WHICH INSURANCE IS A F F O R D E D UNDER THIS POLICY OR ANY O T H ER POLICY.

6. 5 A P P E A L S
IN THE EVENT T H E INSURED OR ANY OTHER INSURER
E L E C T S NOT TO A P P E A L A JUDGMENT WHICH EXCEEDS THE R E TAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMITS, THE COMPANY MAY E L E C T TO
MAKE SUCH A P P E A L . THE COMPANY SHALL BE LIABLE IN ADDITION
T O T H E A P P L I C A B L E LTMIT O F LIABILITY, FOR A L L COSTS, TAXES,
E X P E N S E S INCURRED AND INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS A T T R I B U T A B L E
T O SUCH AN A P P E A L .
6. 6

LOSS P A Y A B L E . T H E COMPANY'S LIABIUTY UNDER THIS P O U C Y WITH
R E S P E C T TO ANY OCCURRENCE SHALL NOT ATTACH UNTIL T H E
AMOUNT O F THE A P P L I C A B L E RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMIT
HAS BEEN PAID BY OR ON B E H A L F OF T H E INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF
SUCH OCCURRENCE. THE INSURED SHALL MAKE CLAIM FOR ANY LOSS
UNDER THIS POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE A F T E R :
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(A) THE INSURED SHALL HAVE PAID ULTIMATE NET LOSS IN EXCESS
OF THE RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMIT WITH RESPECT
TO ANY OCCURRENCE, OR
(B) THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO PAY SUCH AMOUNTS SHALL HAVE
BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
INSURED AFTER ACTUAL TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF
THE INSURED, THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY.
CLAIM FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE INSURED ON
ACCOUNT OF THE SAME OCCURRENCE SHALL BE SIMILARLY MADE.
ALL LOSSES COVERED BY THIS POLICY SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE
BY THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY
CLAIMED AND PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS
POLICY.
6. 7 ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY. NO ACTION SHALL LIE AGAINST THE
COMPANY UNLESS, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT THERETO, THE INSURED SHALL HAVE FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE TERMS OF THIS
POLICY, NOR UNTIL THE AMOUNT OF THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO
PAY SHALL HAVE BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THE INSURED, THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY.
ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION OR THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
THEREOF WHO HAS SECURED SUCH JUDGMENT OR WRITTEN AGREEMENT SHALL THEREAFTER BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THIS
POLICY TO THE EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY. NO PERSON OR ORGANIZATION SHALL HAVE ANY RIGHT UNDER
THIS POLICY TO JOIN THE COMPANY AS A PARTY TO ANY ACTION
AGAINST THE INSURED TO DETERMINE THE INSURED'S LIABILITY.
NOR SHALL THE COMPANY BE IMPLEADED BY THE INSURED OR HIS
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE. BANKRUPTCY OR INSOLVENCY OF THE INSURED OR OF THE INSURED'S ESTATE SHALL NOT RELIEVE THE COMPANY O F ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER.
6. 8

SUBROGATION. IN THE EVENT OF ANY PAYMENT UNDER THIS POLICY,
THE COMPANY SHALL PARTICIPATE WITH THE INSURED AND ANY OTHER INSURER IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INSURED'S RIGHTS OF RECOVERY AGAINST ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION LIABLE THEREFOR, EXC E P T A N INSURED HEREIN. RECOVERIES SHALL BE APPLIED FIRST
TO REIMBURSE ANY INTEREST (INCLUDING THE INSURED) THAT MAY
HAVE PAID ANY AMOUNT WITH RESPECT TO LIABILITY IN EXCESS OF
THE LIMIT OF THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY HEREUNDER; THEN TO R E IMBURSE THE COMPANY UP TO THE AMOUNT PAID HEREUNDER; AND
LASTLY TO REIMBURSE SUCH INTERESTS (INCLUDING THE INSURED),
OF WHOM THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS, AS ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM
THE RESIDUE, IF ANY; BUT A DIFFERENT APPORTIONMENT MAY BE
MADE TO E F F E C T SETTLEMENT OF A CLAIM BY AGREEMENT SIGNED
BY A L L INTERESTS. REASONABLE EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE EXER-
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CISE OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY SHALL BE APPORTIONED AMONG ALL
INTERESTS IN THE RATIO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOSSES FOR WHICH
RECOVERY IS SOUGHT.
6. 9

CHANGES. NOTICE TO ANY AGENT OR KNOWLEDGE POSSESSED BY ANY
AGENT OR BY ANY OTHER PERSON SHALL NOT EFFECT A WAIVER OR
A CHANGE IN ANY PART OF THIS POLICY OR ESTOP THE COMPANY
FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHTS UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY;
NOR SHALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY BE WAIVED OR CHANGED, EXCEPT BY ENDORSEMENT ISSUED TO FORM A PART OF THIS POLICY,
SIGNED BY AN AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMPANY.

6. 10 ASSIGNMENT. ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST UNDER THIS POLICY SHALL
NOT BIND THE COMPANY UNTIL ITS CONSENT IS ENDORSED HEREON.
6.11 CANCELLATION. THIS POLICY MAY BE CANCELLED BY THE NAMED
INSURED FIRST NAMED IN SECTION 1. 1 OR BY THE COMPANY BY MAILING TO THE OTHER PARTY WRITTEN NOTICE STATING WHEN, NOT
LESS THAN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER, CANCELLATION SHALL BE E F F E C TIVE. THE MAILING OF NOTICE AS AFORESAID SHALL BE SUFFICIENT
PROOF OF NOTICE AND THE EFFECTIVE DATE AND HOUR OF CANCELLATION STATED EST THE NOTICE SHALL BECOME THE END OF THE
POLICY PERIOD. DELIVERY OF SUCH WRITTEN NOTICE EITHER BY THE
NAMED INSURED OR BY THE COMPANY SHALL BE EQUIVALENT TO
MAILING.
IF THE NAMED INSURED CANCELS, EARNED PREMIUM SHALL BE COMPUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CUSTOMARY SHORT RATE TABLE
AND PROCEDURE. IF THE COMPANY CANCELS, EARNED PREMIUM
SHALL BE COMPUTED PRO RATA. PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT MAY BE
MADE EITHER AT THE TIME CANCELLATION IS E F F E C T E D OR AS SOON
AS PRACTICABLE AFTER CANCELLATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE, BUT
PAYMENT OR TENDER OF UNEARNED PREMIUM IS NOT A CONDITION
OF CANCELLATION.
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COMPANY OR ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE HAS ISSUED OR MAY ISSUE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE INSURED.
CERTIFICATES OF INSURANCE AND/OR STATUTORY FILINGS AND/OR
OTHER EVIDENCES OF INSURANCE (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
CERTIFICATES) UNDER THIS POLICY WHICH CERTIFICATES REQUIRE
THE COMPANY TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO THE
RECIPIENTS OF SUCH CERTIFICATES OR OTHERS, THEN THE INSURED.
IF IT SHOULD ELECT TO CANCEL THIS POLICY, SHALL GIVE THE COMPANY NOT LESS THAN THE SAME ADVANCE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION AS IS REQUIRED TO B E GIVEN BY THE COMPANY UNDER SUCH
CERTIFICATES AND IN DOING SO SHALL ALLOW THE COMPANY NOT
LESS THAN THREE BUSINESS DAYS FOR THE PREPARATION AND MAILING OF SUCH NOTICES OF CANCELLATION TO THE RECIPIENTS OF
SUCH CERTIFICATES.
6. 12 DECLARATIONS. BY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS POLICY THE NAMED INSURED AGREES THAT THE STATEMENTS IN THE APPLICATION AND IN
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LYING INSURANCE. WHICH ARE O F F E R E D AS AN INDUCEMENT TO THE
COMPANY TO ISSUE AND CONTINUE THIS POLICY. ARE ITS A G R E E MENTS AND REPRESENTATIONS. THAT THIS POLICY IS ISSUED AND
CONTINUED IN RELIANCE UPON THE TRUTH O F SUCH R E P R E S E N T A TIONS AND THAT THIS POLICY EMBODIES A L L AGREEMENTS EXISTING B E T W E E N T H E NAMED INSURED AND THE COMPANY OR ANY OF
ITS AGENTS RELATING TO THIS INSURANCE

A T T A C H E D TO AND FORMING A P A R T O F POLICY NO.
ISSUED TO:

CHESS IE SYSTEM, I N C . , ET AL

DATED:

AUGUST \k,

.,,-„.,

\>JJ

HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY

BY
(AUTHORIZED R E P R E S E N T A T I V E )
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